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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) (2001) .
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for decision by this Court are:
1.

Whether Appellant ("Ms. Womack") properly denied
Appellee's ("Ms. Snow's") $5,000 exempt property
because of the statute of limitations, insufficiency of
estate assets and Ms. Snow's receipt of various items
of personal property from the estate. (R. 180-82).

2.

Whether the trial court erred in granting Ms. Snow's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment concerning the
interpretation of five key provisions in the trust:
A.

whether Ms. Womack was only entitled to a life
estate or whether she obtained a remainder
interest; (R. 583).

B.

whether Ms. Womack's use of the trust assets was
limited to only the interest generated by the
trust principal; (R. 583).

C.

whether Ms. Womack was within her rights to use
trust principal to move the mobile home; (R. 583).

D.

whether Ms. Womack, as trustee, was entitled to
have attorney's fees paid from the estate pursuant
to the express terms of the trust; (R. 583) .

E.

whether Ms. Womack was entitled to have the lien
on the van paid off from estate assets pursuant to
the terms of the trust. (R. 583).

1

3.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to allow
extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent and
surrounding circumstances to assist in interpreting
ambiguities in the trust. (R. 583).
Because disposition of a case on summary judgment

denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, the appellate
court must review the evidence in the light most favorable
to the losing party.

The appellate court must affirm only

where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to any
material issues of fact, or where, even according to the
facts as contended by the losing party, the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hunt v. ESI Enq'q,
Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d
651 (Utah 1991).
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law
rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise
the trial court's legal conclusions. Barber v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Winegar v. Froerer
Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
If a contract is ambiguous and the trial court makes
findings of fact from extrinsic evidence, the appellate
court's review is strictly limited.

However, if the

contract is ambiguous but the case is decided on summary
judgment, the appellate court can affirm only if the
2

undisputed material facts concerning the parties' intent
demonstrate that the successful litigant's position is
correct as a matter of law. Fashion Place Inv., Ltd. v. Salt
Lake County/Salt Lake County Mental Health, 776 P.2d 941
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989).
III.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Among the determinative statutes are Utah Code Ann. §§
75-1-201, 75-2-402 (1988), 75-2-405(1), 75-3-803 and 75-7402.

The full text of the statutes is provided in the

addendum, while the more pertinent provisions of the
statutes are set forth below as follows:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201.

General definitions.

See addendum.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-402 (1988).
- Amount.

Exempt Property

In addition to the homestead allowance,
the surviving spouse of a decedent who
was domiciled in this state is entitled
from the estate to value not exceeding
$5,000 in excess of any security
interests therein in household furniture,
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and
personal effects. If there is no
surviving spouse, children of the
decedent are entitled jointly to the same
value....These rights are in addition to
any benefit or share passing to the
surviving spouse or children by intestate
3

succession, but is chargeable against any
share passing by the will of the decedent
unless the will provides otherwise.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-405(1). Source,
determination and documentation.
...the surviving spouse, guardians of minor
children, or children who are adults may select
property of the estate as ...estate property.'"

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803.
See addendum.

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402
See addendum.
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal is to review the Memorandum Decision,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Final Decision and
Order of the Third District Court concerning Ms. Snow's
Motion for Summary Judgment on Exempt Property Claim and
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment granted by the District
Court. (R. 153-57, 180-84, 223-24, 489-95, 516-17).
V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Richard D. Snow ("Decedent") executed The Richard D.

Snow Family Trust ("trust") on November 18, 1993, for the
purposes of administering his estate during his life and after
4

his death. At the same time, Mr. Snow executed his Last Will and
Testament. (R. 67-100) .
2.

Mr. Snow executed an Amendment to the Richard D. Snow

Family Trust ("amendment") on September 15, 1995.

The Trust and

Amendment designated Ruby Womack, who had lived with Mr. Snow and
who had been his companion for years, to act as Trustee upon
Decedent's incapacity or death.

Mr. Snow's Will designated Ms.

Womack as personal representative. (R. 291-373).
3.

Mr. Snow died on January 28, 1998. (R. 67-100).

4.

Based on the language of the amended trust and Mr.

Snow's expressed intent prior to his death, Ms. Womack believed
that she had complete discretion to use the trust assets.
Accordingly, Ms. Womack used trust funds to: (1) pay the balance
of the loan on the van than was granted to her pursuant to the
trust; (2) pay moving expenses to relocate the mobile home she
and Richard Snow had occupied prior to his death which was
granted to her by the trust; and (3) pay attorney's fees incurred
in administering the trust and to defend this action. (R. 291373, 583) .
5.

Pursuant to a "Letter of Disposition of Personal

Effects," attached as part of Schedule A to the amended trust,
Marcia Snow, Mr. Snow's only living child, received personal
property which included jewelry, crystal, oil paintings, and
other belongings. (R. 291-373).

5

6.

On June 2, 1998, Ms. Womack filed an Inventory of

the property owned by decedent Mr. Snow on the date of his death.
The Inventory listed "Miscellaneous Personal Effects," referenced
the schedules which granted the specific bequests and listed
their value as unknown. (R. 291-373).
7.

On January 20, 1999, Ms. Snow initiated an action in

the Third District Court and filed a Petition for Formal
Appointment of Special Administrator, Removal of Trustee, and
Request for Accounting of Estate and Trust Assets; for an Order
from the Court Appointing Marcia L. Snow as the Special
Administrator of the Estate, to Act without Bond; that the Court
Order an Accounting of the Assets of the Estate and Trust,
Including but not Limited to All Distributions made from the
Estate or Trust, be Provided by Ruby Womack from the time of
Decedent's Death up to the Present Date; for an Order Removing
Ruby Womack as Trustee; and for an Order Appointing Marcia L.
Snow as Tirustee of the Trust. (R. 1-7) .
8.

On July 14, 1999, Ms. Snow filed a Claim of Exempted

Property in the amount of $10,000 pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-2-403.
(R. 180-82) .
9*

On July 30, 1999, Ms. Womack denied Ms. Snow's claim

as being untimely and without merit. (R. 180-182) .
10.

Chris Welch and Jim Goss have personal knowledge as

to statements the decedent, Mr. Snow, made regarding his intent

6

and wishes concerning the disposition of his trust estate. Mr.
Snow intended for Ms. Womack to be the sole beneficiary and the
person in charge of all of his affairs.

He did not want to

include his children in the disposition of his estate.

He did

not want Ms. Snow to interfere with the administration of his
estate. (R. 291-373) .
11.

Mr. Snow had an estranged and limited relationship

with Ms. Snow because she refused to help and visit or come
around when her mother was dying of cancer. (R. 291-373).
12.

The trial court did not consider the testator's

intent or any extrinsic evidence of the surrounding
circumstances or statements made by witnesses concerning the
testator's intent in reaching its decision. (R. 583).
13.

There has been no probate of the decedent's estate

and no personal representative has been appointed.
VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court made several mistakes of law that
should be overturned by this court.

First, the trial court

granted Ms. Snow's $5,000 exempt property claim despite the
fact that no probate estate existed and that Ms. Snow had
already received personal property from the estate in an
unknown value.

Instead of hearing evidence on the value of
7

this property to determine whether it satisfied the $5,000
claim, the court found that the property had little or no
value because the value was unknown. (R. 180-82).
Second, the court erred in interpreting several key
provisions in the trust.

The court found that Ms. Snow was

entitled to a remainder interest where the trust was silent
on this issue and despite clear language granting a
remainder interest to Ms. Womack.

The court also found that

the word "income" referred only to interest generated from
principal as opposed to money used for living expenses.

The

court also limited the trustee's discretion in using
principal from the trust and paying certain debts.

Finally,

the court limited the trustee's reimbursement for attorney's
fees despite the express language in the trust and relevant
statutes.
In making the errors described above, the court failed
to consider the testator's intent when interpreting
ambiguous provisions in the trust.

The court looked to

rules of statutory construction but did not consider
evidence of the surrounding circumstances or statements from
witnesses with personal knowledge concerning the decedent's
intent.

Based on the above factors, this court should

8

reverse the trial court and remand this case for further
fact determinations consistent with applicable law.
VII.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED MS. SNOW'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF
$5,000 ON HER EXEMPT PROPERTY CLAIMS UNDER 75-2402 BECAUSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
INSUFFICIENCY OF ESTATE ASSETS AND BECAUSE SHE
RECEIVED PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM THE TRUST.

Section 75-2-402 provides:
In addition to the homestead allowance, the
surviving spouse of a decedent who was domiciled
in this state is entitled from the estate to value
not exceeding $5,000 in excess of any security
interests therein in household furniture,
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal
effects. If there is no surviving souse, children
of the decedent are entitled jointly to the same
value. . . These rights are in addition to any
benefit or share passing to the surviving spouse
or children by intestate succession, but is
chargeable against any share passing by the will
of the decedent unless the will provides
otherwise.l

lr

This version of 75-2-402 was in effect at the time of
Mr. Snow's death. A new version of the statute was enacted
by by Laws 1998, chp. 39, section 41, but did not become
effective until July 1, 1998. The text of the new statute is
contained in 75-2-403 and states: "In addition to the
homestead allowance, the decedent's surviving spouse is
entitled from the estate to a value, not exceeding $10,000
in excess of any security interests therein, in household
furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances, ad personal
effects. If there is no surviving souse, the decedent's
9

1)

MS. SNOW IS BARRED BY THE TIME LIMITATIONS SET
FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-803 FROM FILING
HER EXEMPT PROPERTY CLAIM.

Because Ms. Snow did not file her exempt property claim
within the time period prescribed by law, she is barred from
making this claim against the trust.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-

803 provides in pertinent part:
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which
arise at or after the death of the decedent,
including claims of the state and any of its
subdivisions, whether due or to become due,
absolute or contingent, liquidated or
unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other
legal basis are barred against the estate, the
personal representative, and the heirs and
devisees of the decedent, unless presented as
follows:
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal
representative within three months after
performance by the personal representative is due;
or
(b) any other claim within the later of three
months after it arises, or the time specified in
Subsection (1)(a).

children are entitled jointly to the same value. . . .
Unless otherwise provided by the will or governing
instrument, the exempt property allowance is chargeable
against any benefit or share passing to the surviving
spouse, if any, or if there is no surviving spouse, to the
decedent's children, by the will of the decedent, by
intestate succession, by way of elective share, and by way
of nonprobate transfers as defined in Sections 75-2-205 and
75-2-206."

10

As used in this section, "claims" include, "liabilities
of the decedent ...whether arising in contract, in tort, or
otherwise, and liabilities of the estate which arise at or
after the death of the decedent."
201.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-

Here, Ms. Snow's claim is for an exempt property

allowance under the Utah Uniform Probate Code arising at the
time of decedent's death.

As such, to be valid Ms. Snow's

claim must have been submitted to the decedent's Personal
Representative within three months of the decedent's death
pursuant to the above statute.
Ms. Snow failed to bring her claim of exempt property
until July 14, 1999. (R. 180-82).

This is a period of

nearly 18 months in which Petitioner waited to bring an
exempt property claim against the estate.

As noted in the

case of Jones v. State Tax Comm'n, such claims must be
filed, after proper notice, within the time limit or be
forever barred.

104 P.2d 210 (1940).

Because Ms. Snow

failed to present her claim against the estate within the
three month time limit imposed by Section 75-3-803, Ms.
Snow's claim is forever barred.
2)

MS. SNOW'S EXEMPT PROPERTY CLAIM SHOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE DECEDENT'S ESTATE
HAD NO ASSETS FROM WHICH TO SATISFY HER CLAIM.

11

At the decedent's death, he did not have a probate
estate from which Ms, Snow's claim might be satisfied
because he did not own any assets of value.

Under Utah Code

Ann. § 75-2-405(1), "the surviving spouse, guardians of
minor children, or children who are adults may select
property of the estate as ...exempt property."

The UUPC

defines "estate" to include only, "the

of

decedent...whose

affairs

are subject

property

to this

the

Title."

Utah

Code Ann. § 75-1-201 (2001). (Emphasis added).
Nearly four and one-half years prior to his death, the
decedent created, funded, and properly executed The Richard
D. Snow Family Trust. (R. 67-100).

Because the purposes of

this trust were to create a mechanism by which the decedent
would be taken care of in the event he became incapacitated
and to distribute the decedent's possessions in a
predetermined manner after he no longer needed use of the
items, substantially all of the decedent's assets and
possessions were transferred to the trustee of the trust.
(Exhibit " A " ) .

The duty of the trustee was to manage and

distribute according to the terms of the trust. Id.
Under very well established trust law, assets
transferred to a trustee to be managed and distributed
12

according to the terms of a valid trust document are no
longer the possessions of the grantor and therefore are not
part of the grantor's estate at death.

Horn v. First

Security Bank of Utah, 548 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1976) .

Despite

this, Ms. Snow is attempting to include the trust in her
claim against the estate.
Under Sections 75-2-405(1) and 75-1-201 of the Utah
Uniform Probate Code, assets other than those belonging to
the estate are not available for satisfaction of exempt
property claims.

Because the probate estate contained no

assets of value, Ms. Snow's exempt property claim against
the estate should be denied.
3)

MS. SNOW RECEIVED ITEMS OF DECEDENT'S PERSONAL
PROPERTY UNDER THE TRUST THAT MAY BE WORTH
MORE THAN THE $5,000 EXEMPT PROPERTY
ALLOWANCE.

Ms. Snow received property from the trust worth a
substantial sum. (R. 291-373).

The items Ms. Snow was

entitled to receive under the trust include crystal pieces,
electronic equipment, furniture, jewelry, an oil painting,
and personal memorabilia. Id.

The aggregate value of these

items is not known, however, it is very likely that the
value exceeds the $5,000 exempt property allowance. (R. 291373) .
13

The court below determined that, based on the Inventory
filed by Ms. Womack, the property received by Ms. Snow did
not have a value of $5,000.

The court stated that the

Inventory specified that the property had little or no
value. (R. 180-82).

Here, the court was in error because

the inventory lists the value of this property as unknown.
Nowhere does it state that the property had little or no
value. (R. 291-373) .
The only way to determine the actual value of these
items is through an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

This

court should remand this case and specifically this issue to
the trial court for a determination of the value of the
property received by Ms. Snow in order to establish whether
Ms. Snow's exempt property claim should have been granted.
B)

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING MS. SNOW'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT CONCERNING THE
INTERPRETATION OF FIVE KEY PROVISIONS IN THE
TRUST.
1)

PURSUANT TO THE TRUST AMENDMENT, MS. WOMACK
WAS ENTITLED TO A LIFE ESTATE AND REMAINDER
INTEREST IN THE DECEDENT'S MOBILE HOME.

The first page of the amendment, numbered paragraph 1
of the Special Provisions states that "Ruby Womack may live
in the mobile home, Guredon, as long as she desires or until

14

she remarries or dies." (Exhibit " A " ) .

This bequest

provides a life estate in favor of Ms. Womack, which can be
terminated on the occurrence of any one of the following
three events: (1) Ms. Womack's death; (2) Ms. Womack's
remarriage; or (3) Ms. Womack's ceasing to live in the
mobile home.
Paragraph three of the amendment provides, "The
remainder of the trust estate shall be held in trust to
provide Ruby Womack with income.

Ruby shall have complete

discretion in the use of the trust estate."

The above

language creates a remainder interest for Ms. Womack and
makes no mention of a remainder interest for Ms. Snow.

The

"remainder" here is a future interest vested in Ms. Womack,
a transferee that will become possessory upon the expiration
of all prior interests.

See Wills, Trusts & Estates,

Dukeminier, p. 751 (Little Brown 1995).
Upon the expiration of the life estate in the mobile
home, the remainder interest will vest in Ms. Womack.

Thus,

under the express provisions of the trust amendment, Ms.
Womack was given a life estate with a remainder interest to
be used in her sole discretion.

There is no language in the

amendment granting a remainder interest to Ms. Snow.

15

Therefore, Ms. Snow has no right to standing as a
beneficiary where the language of the trust excludes Ms.
Snow from any such claim.
2)

MS. WOMACK'S USE OF THE TRUST ASSETS WAS NOT
LIMITED TO ONLY THE INTEREST GENERATED BY THE
TRUST PRINCIPAL BECAUSE THE TRUST PROVIDED MS.
WOMACK WITH INCOME IN HER SOLE DISCRETION.

In addition to creating a remainder interest for Ms.
Womack, the above language in paragraph three of the
amendment also provides Ms. Womack with income and complete
discretion in the use of the trust estate.

The above

language creates a discretionary trust for Ms. Womack in the
use of the trust estate.

The decedent expressly gave this

discretionary power to the beneficiary, Ms. Womack, rather
than the trustee.

This power is equivalent to a general

power of appointment.

Ms. Womack has the legal right to

appoint as much of the income and principal of the trust up
to the whole as she desires.
The plain language of the amendment indicates that the
trust estate is to be used to provide Ms. Womack with
income.

If the decedent had intended to provide Ms. Womack

with the trust's income, as Ms. Snow claims, he could have
easily used that language, but he did not.
Ms. Snow's claim that the term "income" has a different
16

meaning than the meaning relied upon by Ms. Womack indicates
that a "latent ambiguity" may exist in the decedent's
express language.
of law.
1991).

Whether an ambiguity exists is a question

Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah
The general rules of construction of written

instruments apply to construction of trust instruments.
Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974).

A

provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of
terms.

Wineqar at 108.

Here, the decedent's language has

two (2) apparent and reasonable meanings:
1.

The first meaning, as argued by Ms. Snow, is that the

decedent merely meant for Ms. Womack to be entitled to the
trust's income, which amounts to a little over $300 per year. (R.
583) .
2.

The second meaning, relied upon by Ms. Womack, is that

she was entitled to income from the trust, whether from interest
or principal, to supplement her living expenses. R. 291-373).
Ms. Snow relies on Utah Code Ann. § 22-3-4 in her claim
that the word income means interest generated from
principal. (R. 583). Ms. Snow claims that this statutory
definition should prevail in this case.

However, the common

meaning of the word income is money used for expenses.
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If

someone says,

"I'm going to provide you with income," they

don't mean the interest generated from some principal
account, they mean money that they can use for whatever they
wish.
Because both interpretations of income are reasonable,
the trial court should have looked to extrinsic evidence to
determine the decedent's intent in using the word income,
but instead relied on rules of statutory construction
without allowing evidence of the testator's intent.

See

Section C. supra and R. 583). Because the trial court used
rules of statutory construction, a determination of the
decedent's intent should have also be made.

As stated by

this court in Makoff v. Makoff:
The general rules of construction of written
instruments apply to the construction of trust
instruments, and those rules require a
determination of the intention of the settlor
where the creation of the trust is a unilateral
matter.
528 P.2d 797 (Utah 1374).
Here, the trial court admitted to resorting to rules of
construction to aid in interpreting the trust, however the
court made no inquiry and received no evidence concerning
the testator's intent to assist the court in construing the
trust.

This resulted in a decision that was based on
18

speculation rather than the actual intent of the testator.
Because the extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances
and testimony from witnesses shows that the decedent
intended to support Ms. Womack while limiting Ms. Snow's
access to the trust, the court's decision was in error.
3)

PURSUANT TO THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE
TRUST, MS. WOMACK WAS WITHIN HER RIGHTS TO USE
TRUST PRINCIPAL TO MOVE THE MOBILE HOME.

There are two sections of the trust that grant broad
powers to Ms. -Womack, as trustee and beneficiary, to expend
money from the trust.

The first section, discussed

previously, is in paragraph three of the amendment where it
states, "Ruby shall have complete discretion in the use of
the trust estate."

The second section is found in Article

VIII of the trust where it states:
The Trustee shall have full power to do everything
in administering these trusts that they deem to be
for the best interests of the beneficiaries
(whether or not it be authorized or appropriate
for fiduciaries but for this broad grant of
authority), including power to determine whether
and to what extent expenditures should be charged
against principal or income.
(Emphasis added).
Here, Ms. Womack determined that it was in the best
interests of the beneficiaries to move the mobile home.
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Because of Ms. Womack's age, she is unable to perform all of
the maintenance and repairs on the mobile home.

Ms. Womack

moved the mobile home closer to her children so that they
could help her with the upkeep and maintenance.

Assistance

with the upkeep and maintenance of the mobile home benefits
all beneficiaries and was within the rights and prudent
judgment of Ms. Womack as trustee.

Under either of the

above provisions in the trust, Ms. Womack should be allowed
to make this expenditure.
A trustee's discretion is generally broadly construed.
Ward v. Nationsbank of Virginia, N.A., 507 S.E.2d 616 (Va.
1998).

The limitation on this is that, "his actions must be

an exercise of good faith and reasonable judgment to promote
the trust's purpose." .Id., (citation omitted).

Here, Ms.

Womack's broad discretion was not a breach of good faith or
reasonable judgment to promote the trust's purpose.

The

primary purpose of the trust was to provide for Ms. Womack
while giving her the broadest possible discretion.

In

moving the mobile home, Ms. Womack was within the trust's
purpose of providing for her as primary beneficiary.
Therefore, this court should find that Ms. Womack's actions
in moving the mobile home were within her rights as trustee.
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4)

MS. WOMACK IS ENTITLED TO HAVE HER ATTORNEY'S
FEES PAID OUT OF THE ESTATE BASED ON UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-7-402, THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE
TRUST AND UTAH CASE LAW.

Ms. Womack is entitled to all attorney's fees incurred
in this case because Ms. Womack's actions were performed as
trustee.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402(3) provides, in

pertinent part:
A trustee has the power to "pay or contest any
claim; ...employ persons, including attorneys,
auditors, investment advisers, or agents, even if
they are associated with the trustee, to advise or
assist the trustee in the performance of his
administrative duties; ...prosecute or defend
actions, claims, or proceedings for the protection
of trust assets and of the trustee in the
performance of his duties."
(Emphasis added).

Here, Ms. Womack contested Ms. Snow's

exempt property claims and Ms. Womack retained counsel for
assistance in performing her administrative duties. (R. 3743).

In addition, Ms. Womack incurred legal fees in

defending claims against the trust assets as well as claims
that Ms. Womack breached her fiduciary duties.

(R. 1-7).

Further legal fees were also incurred in the ordinary
administration of the trust, such as accountings,
preparation of income taxes, inventories, etc.

Therefore,

based on the above controlling statute, Ms. Womack's

21

attorney's fees should be paid for by the estate because all
of these fees fall under the provisions in the statute.
Under the express terms of the trust, Ms. Womack's
attorney's fees as trustee should be paid for by the estate.
Article VIII of the trust, entitled, "Powers of the
Trustees" states that the Trustees shall have the power to
"delegate powers to agents including accountants, investment
counsel, appraisers, legal counsel, and other experts,
remunerate them and pay their expenses; ...out of income or
principal" (Emphasis added) (Exhibit " A " ) .

Thus, under the

express provisions of the trust itself, Ms. Womack's
attorney's fees should be paid for by the estate.
In addition to the controlling statute and express
provisions of the trust, Utah case law also supports paying
Ms. Womack's attorney's fees out of the estate.

This court

in Walker v. Walker stated, "a trustee is entitled to
reimbursement for all expenses properly incurred in
discharging the responsibilities of his trust." 17 Utah 2d
53, 60, 404 P.2d 253 (1965).

Here, it was Ms. Womack's

responsibility to defend the trust assets against Ms. Snow's
claims.

Ms. Womack was acting in her duty as trustee in

defending this attack on the corpus of the trust.
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that case, the litigation began and continued as a dispute
over who would inherit from the estate.
Here, the litigation began with charges that the
trustee violated her fiduciary duties.

(R. 1-7).

In

addition, much of the litigation has been over trust
interpretation and questions concerning whether Ms. Womack
breached her fiduciary duties in making distributions from
the estate.

Although this case does involve the question of

who should inherit and how much, the issues of trust
administration are paramount.

Therefore, this court should

allow Ms. Womack to pay her attorney's fees from the estate.
In the alternative, this court should remand this case
back to the trial court to determine what portion of the
litigation involved disputes over trust administration and
what portions involved disputes over competing claims to
trust assets.

An award of partial attorney's fees would

come closer to complying with the statute and terms of the
trust than a complete disallowance of Ms. Womack's claims
for attorney's fees.

Because a substantial portion of Ms.

Womack's legal expenses came in defending her actions as
trustee, she should be entitled to attorney's fees for these
matters.
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In Sundquist v. Sundquist, a trustee was defending the
trust from depletion and was entitled to attorney's fees for
this defense.

639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981).

This court allowed

the trustee to be reimbursed for these attorney's fees,
despite the trustee's personal interest in the outcome of
the case.

Here, although Ms. Womack has a personal interest

in the outcome of the case as a beneficiary of the trust,
she should not be excluded from reimbursement of attorney's
fees for actions taken as trustee in defending the trust
from invasion and for attorney's fees incurred in the
ordinary administration of the trust.
The trial court and Ms. Snow relied on Ashton v. Ashton
in determining that Ms. Womack was not entitled to
reimbursement for attorney's fees.

898 P.2d 824 (Utah Ct.

App. 1995) (R. 583). There, the court held that where a
personal representative was acting solely in her role as
claimant rather than administrator, she was not entitled to
attorney's fees.

This case is distinguished from Ashton

because of the nature of the litigation and role of the
claimants.

In Ashton, the personal representative's step-

children appealed a trial court decision that named the
personal representative the sole heir of the estate.
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In

5)

UNDER THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE TRUST, MS.
WOMACK WAS REQUIRED TO USE TRUST PRINCIPAL TO
SETTLE THE DECEDENT'S DEBTS.

The trust expressly requires the trustee to pay debts
of the decedent.

Article VIII, paragraph C states, "From

the income of the trusts hereby created, or, if that be
insufficient, from the principal thereof, the Trustees

shall

pay and discharge all expenses incurred in the
administration of the Trusts." (Emphasis added).

In

accordance with this provision, Ms. Womack, as trustee, paid
the decedent's debt to U.S. Bank on or about February 23,
1998, in the amount of $7,034.67 to pay off the balance
owing on the decedent's van. (R.291-373).

The decedent gave

Ms. Womack the van in a specific bequest in the trust.
(Exhibit "A", Paragraph 2 ) .
Ms. Snow claims that the Utah "non-exoneration"
statute, Section 75-2-609, applies to this gift.
281).

(R. 238-

However, chapter two of the Utah Uniform Probate

Code, relied on by Ms. Snow, applies to intestate succession
and wills, not to trusts.

Chapter seven deals specifically

with trusts and this is the chapter that applies in this
case.

Yet, even applying the provisions in chapter two, Ms.

Womack should still be allowed to pay off this debt.
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The editorial board comment to this section states,
"Section 75-2-609 establishes a rule of construction against
exoneration." (Emphasis added).

However, this court has

mandated that if the language in the trust itself concerning
this matter is clear and unambiguous, this court need not
and may not apply rules of construction to give the document
another meaning or to supplant terms that are not present.
Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991).
Further, the Utah legislature has spoken to this issue
in the Utah Uniform Probate Code, wherein it provides that
"a trustee is authorized to pay and settle claims against
the trust".

See Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402(3) (5) (i) (2001).

Based on the express terms of the trust and statutory trust
authority, Ms. Womack was well within her rights as trustee
to pay off the decedent's loan on the van and the nonexoneration statute should not apply because of the specific
language contained in the trust.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND FAILING TO ALLOW EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF THE
TESTATOR'S INTENT AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES TO
ASSIST IN INTERPRETING AMBIGUITIES IN THE TRUST.

Where an ambiguity exists, the court may consider
extrinsic evidence to determine intent.
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See Wineaar at 108.

Moreover, "A testator's intent may be ^ascertained not alone
from the provision itself, but from a scrutiny of the entire
instrument of which it is a part, and in the light of the
conditions and circumstances in which the instrument came
into existence.'

Thus, extrinsic evidence may be used to

ascertain what the testator intended."

In the Matter of the

Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 1994)
(citations omitted).
Here, there is ambiguity in the decedent's use of the
word "income," as well as ambiguities concerning the
remainder interests of both parties and the trustee's
discretion.

Both parties have provided reasonable

definitions for income, and the court should have looked to
extrinsic evidence to determine the decedent's intent.

Ms.

Womack has evidence of both the surrounding circumstances
and statements from witnesses showing that the decedent
intended to continue supporting Ms. Womack as he did while
he was alive that were submitted below. (R. 291-373) .
In addition, Ms. Womack has evidence of the decedent's
poor relationship with his daughter and his intent to leave
her out cf his trust.

However, these issues raise factual

concerns that require an evidentiary hearing.
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This dispute

over the decedent's intent and evidence surrounding the
creation of the trust preclude summary judgment in this
matter.

Therefore, the trial court below should not have

granted summary judgment for Ms. Snow in this case as key
issues of fact were undecided.
In In the Matter of the Estate of Ashton, 804 P.2d 540
(Utah App. 1990), the Court of Appeals found that the
following provision in a will was ambiguous on its face:
I give, devise and bequeath all of my
real, personal, or mixed, of whatever
whatever situated, which I may own or
right to dispose of at the time of my
beloved wife, Ruth Elizabeth Ashton.
have the full enjoyment of the estate
as she desires or shall live.
Id. at 542-543.

property,
nature or
have the
death to my
She shall
for as long

The court held that "[t]he first sentence

of the disputed passage appears to devise the entire estate
to Mrs. Ashton in fee simple, while the last sentence
suggests a life estate, making the clause ambiguous on its
face." Id.
After making the determination that the provision was
ambiguous, the court held as follows:
While the court did make findings in the present
case, those findings pertain only to the dates of
marriage, execution of the will, signing of an
addendum, and of the death. The findings make no
mention of the testator's intent or the conditions
and circumstances surrounding the making of the
28

will. Nor do the findings include subsidiary
facts showing the steps leading to the court's
conclusion that the decedent intended that Mrs.
Ashton be the only heir, taking the estate free
and absolute of any claim of any other heir.
Because the findings are insufficient to allow for
adequate review, we remand for the trial court to
make explicit, detailed findings as to the
conditions and circumstances surrounding the
making of the will, the nature of the estate, and
finally the decedent's intent, and how that intent
supports the court's conclusion.
(Emphasis added).

The facts of this case are very similar

to those of Ashton regarding the trial court's treatment of
the case.,

Here, the provisions of the trust are even more

ambiguous than the provision in Ashton.

Determining what

the decedent intended in using the word income and whom the
decedent intended to receive a remainder interest, or
whether a remainder interest exists at all is unclear.

Yet,

similar to the facts in Ashton, the trial court refused to
consider the extrinsic evidence concerning the decedent's
intent and surrounding circumstances.
When the trial court interpreted the word "income,"
ruling that Ms. Womack was only entitled to the interest
from principal, the court stated:
Now, in my mind, income is income and while I
understand the position taken by Ms. Walton that I
do not need to look at statutory or constructive
rules, that's exactly what I would have to do in
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order to aid me in the construction of these legal
terms.
(R. 583). Here, the court made a mistake of law by looking
to rules of statutory construction to aid in interpreting
the trust without looking to the decedent's intent as
evidenced by the surrounding circumstances and affidavits of
those with personal knowledge.

Because of this, the case

should be remanded for a determination of the decedent's
intent to aid in interpreting ambiguous provisions in the
trust.
In fact, the trial court issued its decision based in
part on what the trust did not say as opposed to what it
said.

In discussing Ms. Womack's paying off the van, the

court said, "In that way the Court finds most importantly
what was not said ..." (R. 583). Here again, the court is
interpreting ambiguous provisions of the trust based on
statutory construction without allowing extrinsic evidence
of the testator's intent.
Moreover, the trial court did not show what facts led
to their conclusion that Ms. Womack be restricted in her use
of the trust assets to only interest from principal without
discretion as trustee.

In addition, the trial court used no

evidence of surrounding circumstances or the testator's
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intent, despite the ambiguity.

Similar to Ashton, this

court should remand the case to the trial court to determine
these fact issues and preclude summary judgment.
Because the trial court did not allow extrinsic
evidence concerning this ambiguity, the court ruled that
summary judgment was proper because no factual disputes
existed relating to admissible evidence.

Yet, where a court

must interpret ambiguous language in a document, extrinsic
evidence should be admitted to show intent.

Therefore, this

court should remand the case back to the trial court to
consider this evidence in determining the meaning of the
word "income" and the testator's intent relating to
remainder interests as used in the trust.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
The trial court made several mistakes of law that
should be overturned by this court and the case remanded for
further determinations of fact.

First, the court erred in

granting Ms. Snow's exempt property claim.

Second, the

court erred in interpreting several provisions of the trust,
including the remainder interests of the parties, definition
of income, trustee's discretion and ability to pay debts, as
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well as attorney's fees.

Third, the trial court should have

considered the intent of the decedent in interpreting
ambiguous provisions in the trust.

Based on the above

factors, this court should reverse and remand this case for
further proceedings and fact-finding consistent with
governing law.

RoEy'n RoWfe Walton, #82 61
ROWE & WALTON, P.C.
915 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Counsel for Appellant
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THE RICIIA11D D. SNOW

Third Judicial District

FAMILY TRUST

FED 1. 0 1999
SAL! LAKE COUNTY

hyPURPOSE
yA f

0
p

UenulyCli
v

y

The Undersigned, RICHARD D. SNOW, of West-VaHey, Salt Lake
County, and State of Utah, hereby establishes THE RICHARD D. SNOW
FAMILY

TRUST

for

the

purposes

of

owning,

operating

and

administering my estate both during my life and after my death and
avoiding the probate thereof.
ARTICLE I
Transfer in Trust
For good and valuable considerationf the Undersigned, RICHARD
D. SNOW, hereby transfers, conveys, assigns and delivers to the
Trustees and any successor Trustees the property listed on Schedule
"A" or any supplemental schedules annexed hereto and incorporated
herein by reference, to have and to hold the same, and any cash,
securities, or other

property, real and

personal

and

wherever

situate, which the Trustees may, pursuant to any of the provisions
hereof, at any time hereafter hold or acquire, all of such property
being hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Trust Estate"
for the uses and purposes and upon the terms and conditions herein
set forth.
ARTICLE II
Disposition Before the Death of the Undersigned
Before the death of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall hold,
manage, invest, and re-invest the Trust Estate, and shall collect

3
the

income

thereof

and

shall

dispose

of

the

net

income

and

principal as follows:

Subject

to

the

provisions

contained

in

Article

XIII

hereinafter, the Trustees shall pay to the Undersigned all to the
net income of this Trust, in monthly or other convenient
installments, but at least annually.

The Trustees, shall al#0 pay

to the Undersigned as much of the principal of the Trust as the
Undersigned may request. Trustees may, in their discretion, pay or
apply for the benefit of the Undersigned, in addition to the income
payments herein provided for, such amounts as the Trustees may from
time to time deem necessary or advisable for the use and benefit of
the Undersigned.

ARTICLE III
Disposition on Death of the Undersigned
Upon the death of the Undersigned, the property of THE RICHARD
D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST, and including also any other portions added
thereto

from

the

estate

of

the Undersigned

or other

sources,

together with the undistributed income, shall be held in trust and
shall be administered and disposed of as follows:

A.

An amount determined solely by the Trustees shall be set

aside from the balance of the funds held in trust, and shall be
2

used

for

the

support,

and

education

of

Undersiqnedr s

the

beneficiaries who have not reached aye twenty-one (2.1) prior to the
death of the Undersigned.

In determining the amount to be set

aside under the provisions of this paragraph, and the amounts to be
paid therefromf

the Trustee? shall take into account the needs,

age.^ r assets, and other available sources o[ income and support:,
including any manner of state or federal financial assistance, to
the

Undersigned's

unqualified

children.

discretion,

The

shall

Trustees,

determine

in
the

their
amount

sole

and

to

be

distributed, the child or children to whom distributions are to be
made, and

the time and manner; of distributions made under this

paragraph, and shall distribute according to the various needs of
the children, even if such distributions

are unequal.

A child

shall receive no further distributions pursuant to this paragraph
after she has attained the age designated above.

Immediately upon

the death of the Undersigned, the balance, if any, of the amounts
set aside under this paragraph shall be distributed according to
Article III., paragraph D«, below.
B.

After setting aside sufficient amounts to carry out the

purposes of Article III., paragraph A., above, the Trustees shall
next divide the Trust Estate into as many equal parts as may be
necessary

to

provide

one

part,

or

share,

for

each

of

the

Undersigned's children then living, and one part, or share, for the
then-living

descendants,

taken

collectively,

of

each

of

Undersigned's children who may then be deceased, which such

3

the

BQ^^QQ^phare
^SM^B^for^such
WMS^ffi each

shall be further divided into separate parts or

descendants,

they taking per stirpes; and as thusly

said share or part shall be held as a separate trust

^B^FlTe benefit of the person or persons Cor whom it was set aside
and shall be held, administered as follows:
1. The Trustees may use and expend or apply so much or
all of first, the income, and second, the principal of the trusts
hereby created for the benefit of a beneficiary hereof, and said
amounts shall be used as the Trustees determine necessary or
advisable and in such reasonable manner as the Trustees see fit, to
provide for the health, reasonable comfort, education, support, and
maintenance of the beneficiary for whom such trust shall have been
created. Provided, however, that in determining
said amounts the Trustees shall first take into account any
distributions provided for such beneficiary under Article III.,
paragraph A., above, and the needs, assets, and other available
sources of income and support of a beneficiary thereof. Provided,
however, the said powers of encroachments upon a beneficiary's
share shall be limited to the respective share held for the
respective beneficiary.
2. Upon the death of the undersigned, the Trustees shall
distribute to that respective beneficiary, the share of the Trust
Estate for said beneficiary, free and clear of trust if and when
that beneficiary has reached twenty-one (21) years of age.
3. In the event a beneficiary is for any reason unable
or unwilling to take any portion of his or her share of the Trust
Estate, or in the event of the death of any of the beneficiaries,
namely the Undersigned's children,
pursuant to the above
paragraphs of this Article III., then such portion shall be
distributed in whole to his or her living descendants, equally,
they taking per stirpes; and if there be no such descendants, then
such funds shall be divided equally between such beneficiary's
then-living brothers and sisters, and if there be no brother or
sister then living, then such funds shall be divided equally
between the descendants of such beneficiary's brothers and sisters,
said descendants taking per stirpes; and if there be no descendants
of such beneficiary's brothers or sisters then living, then the
Trustees
shall
distribute
according
to
the principle
of
representation, the portion of the property of that beneficiary to
the other portions of the other living beneficiaries, and if there
are no other living beneficiaries, then: said heirs at law of the
Undersigned, shall take the Trust property in the same priority and
in the same distributive order as listed in the law of intestate
succession in force in the state of the Undersigned's residence on
the date of the signing of this Trust Agreement. Notwithstanding
4

anything contained to the contrary in this paragraph, if, under the
provisions of this subparagraph 3., of paragraph D., Article III.,
any person under age twenty-one (21) shall become entitled to a
share of the Trust Estate, such share shall not be distributed to
such beneficiary's benefit, and shall be held, administered, and
disposed of according to subparagraphs 1., 2., and 3., of paragraph
B., Article III.
4. If under the terms of this Article III., and upon the
death of any beneficiary, any other person for whom a share or
portion is being held in trust shall become entitled to an
additional share or portion, such additional share or portion shall
not necessarily be delivered free of trust, but shall be added to
the principal of the share or portion held in trust for
such person and shall go as and with the same.
C.

At

the death of

the Undersigned,

the Trustees

shall

distribute all of the Undersigned's personal effects, including any
contents of the Undersigned's residence, according to that certain
Letter of Disposition of Personal Effects referring to Article III,
Subparagraph B, of this Trust Agreement, dated and signed by the
Undersigned and located among the Undersigned's important papers at
the time of his death.
D.

Whenever,

used

herein,

the

terms

"issue",

"child",

"children", and "descendants" include adopted issue, adopted child,
adopted children and adopted descendants, as well as natural issue,
natural

child,

natural

include

descendants

of

children,
adopted

and

natural

issued,

children, and adopted descendants.

descendants,

adopted

Provided,

child,

and

adopted

however, adopted

issue who are also natural issue shall take their share oj the
Trust Estate only in one capacity, such capacity being trite one
which grants to such issue the larger share. Where applicable, the
masculine includes the feminine, and vice versa, and the neuter
includes

the

masculine

or

feminine,
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and

vice

versa.

Where

applicable,

t h e s i n g u l a r i n c l u d e * Llio plur.ni

«nd </Jo« v&rtffl*

ARTICLE IV

Spendthrift Provision
After any of the trusts created herein become irrevocable,
the interests of each beneficiary in income and principal shall be
free

from the control or interference of any creditor of such

beneficiary, or the spouse of a married beneficiary, or the parent
of a child beneficiary, and shall not be subject to attachment or
be subject to assignment unless herein specified otherwise.
ARTICLE V
Invalid Provisions
If any of the provisions of this Trust are held to be invalid,
none of the other Trust Agreement provisions

shall thereby be

rendered invalid or inoperative as long as they do not frustrate
the intents of the Undersigned, but tend to accomplish his over-all
objectives .
ARTICLE VI
Perpetuities Savings Clause
In any event, and anything to the contrary herein contained
notwithstanding,

the

trusts

created

in

this

agreement

shall

terminate upon the day next preceding the expiration of twenty-one
(21) years after the death of the Undersigned and his issue now
living,

in

the

event

these

trusts

shall

not

terminated in accordance with the terms hereof.

have

previously

In the event of

termination of these trusts provided for in this paragraph, the
Trustees shall distribute the Trust Estate as it shall then be
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constituted, together with any net income, to the beneficiaries
then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate, in the same
proportions in which they are entitled to such income.
ARTICLE VI1
Trustees
A.

The following people will act as trustees in the

following order of succession:

FIRST:

RICHARD D. SNOW is to act solely as the Trustee

of THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST, unless he becomes disabled or
legally

incompetent

or

placed

in

n

rehabilitation

facility,

hospital, nursing homer or long-term health care facility, then the
next successor trustee shall act as Trustee.

SECOND:

Upon the death or inability

to function of

RICHARD D. SNOW then RUDY WOMACK shall act solely as Trustee of
THE RICHAJ1D D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST.

THIRD:

Upon the death or incapacitation of RUDY WOMACK,

a Trustee shall be chosen by a majority of the beneficiaries, with
a

parent

or

legal

guardian

voting

for

minor

beneficiaries;

provided, however, that the issue of any deceased child shall have
collectively only one vote.
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****SPECIAL PROVISIONS****
UPON THE DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED, THIS TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE
DISTRIBUTED AS FOLLOWS:
1.
RUBY WOMACK MAY LIVE IN THE MOBILE.HOte, GUREDON, AS LONG
^6'
AS SHE DESIRES OR UNTIL SHE REMARRIES OR SHE DIES, AT T.HA-T_*JHHE_J.'HE--^ *
MOBILE HOME SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO MARCIA ELLINGSON, PER STIRPES.
THE SAID MOBILE HOME SHALL NOT BE SOLD, LEASED, OR RENTED BY RUBY
WOMACK.
_ /
. _
.
t/A
2.
WOMACK.

THE-MOTOR-HOMBr-QKANACAN, SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO RUBY

3.r
THE BALANCE OF THE TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED- TO*''
MAJ&CIA\ELI/INGSON,) PER STIRPES .
5,^OU/
4.
PATRICIA SPROUSE SHALL NOT RECEIVE ANYTHING FROM THIS
TRUST ESTATE AS SHE ALREADY RECEIVED HER SHARE PRJOR TO THE
UNDERSIGNED'S DEATH, INCLUDING:

/??<f f'~0l?,l

A) 1901 PONTIAC,

'//a'jU^Jj

*%$!'**&

B) 19 07 FORD RANGER PICKUP TRUCK,
C) PAYMENT OF HER AND HER HUSBAND'S DEBTS IN THE
AMOUNT OF APPROXIMATELY TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS
($20,000), AND
D) SHIRLEY SNOW'S RINGS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS
WORTH
APPROXIMATELY
TWENTY
THOUSAND
DOLLARS
($20,000).
THESE ABOVE SPECIAL PROVISIONS SUPERSEDE ALL OTHERS IN THIS
TRUST.

CATASTROPHIC ILLNESS PROVISION
If at any time the undersigned should become disabled and
placed in a rehabilitation facility, hospital nursing home, or
long-term health care facility, then this trust shall become
irrevocable and the disabled trustor shall be forbidden to act as
8

Trustee and shall forfeit any benefit or share of this trust estate
except an income benefit and only to the extent that it will not
jeopardize his Medicaid eligibility or any trust assets.
D.

Whenever more than two Trustees are designated to act

concurrently, a majority of the Trustees, whether individual or
corporate, shall have the power to make any provision, undertake
any action, or execute any documents affecting the Trusts created
herein, but

a dissenting

or nonassenting

Trustee

shall not be

responsible for any action taken by the majority pursuant to such
decision.

Before or after the death of the Undersigned, if only

two individual Trustees are in office, they must act unanimously;
provided, however, the Trustees may form joint savings, checking or
investment accounts that require onJy one Trustee's signature to
effect transactions for such an account.

If an individual and a

corporate

determination

Trustee

are

in

office,

the

of

the

individual Trustee shall be binding.
C.
of

the

Any Trustee may from time to time delegate to one or more
remaining

Trustees

any

powers, duties, or discretions.

Every such delegation shall be made by a writing delivered to the
delegate or delegates, and shall remain effective for the time
therein

specified

similarly delivered.

or

until

earlier

revocation

by

a

writing

Every one dealing with the Trustees shall be

absolutely protected in relying upon the certificate of any Trustee
as to who are the Trustees for the time being acting, and as to the
extent of their authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise,
U.

No Trustee named above need give bond in any jurisdiction.
9

If a fiduciary's bond may not be dispensed with, the Undersigned
request that the bond be accepted without surety and in the lowest
possible amount.

In the absence of breach of trust, no Trustee

shall ever be required

to qualify

before, be appointed by, or

account to any court, or obtain the order or approval of any court
in the exercise of any power or discretion herein given.
ARTICLE VI11
rowers of the Trustees
A.

The Trustees shall have full power to do everything in

administering

these

trusts

that they deem

to be

for the best

interests of the beneficiaries (whether or not it be authorized or
appropriate for fiduciaries but for this broad grant of authority),
including power:
1. To acquire by purchase or otherwise, and to retain
so long as they deem advisable, any kind of realty or personal
property, or undivided interests therein, including common and
preferred stocks, bonds, or other unsecured obligations, options,
warrants, interests in investment trusts and discretionary common
trust 'funds, all without diversifications
as to kind or
amount,without being limited to investments authorized by law for
the investment of trust funds, and power to hold or take title to
property in the name of a nominee.
2. To sell for cash or on credit, at private or public
sale, exchange, hypothecate, sell short, or otherwise dispose of
any real or personal property.
3.
To make distributions, including distributions to
themselves as trustees, in kind or in money or partly in each, even
if shares be composed differently; for such purposes, the valuation
of the Trustees shall be given effect if reasonably made.
4. If, in the Trustee's sole discretion, any beneficiary
(whether a minor or of legal age) is incapable of making proper
disposition of any sum of income or principal that is payable or
appointed to said beneficiary under the previous
terms of this
Trust Agreement, the Trustees may apply said sum to or on behalf of
the beneficiary by any one or more of the following methods: by
payments on behalf of the beneficiary to any one with whom the
10

beneficiary
resides, or by payments
in discharge of the
beneficiary's bills or debts, including bills for premiums on any
insurance policies, or by paying an allowance to a beneficiary
directly. The foregoing payments shall be made without regard to
other resources of the beneficiary, or the duty of any person to
support the beneficiary and without the intervention of any
guardian or like fiduciary; provided, however, that the Trustees
shall insure and see to the application of the funds for the
benefit of the beneficiary, so that the funds will not be used by
any other person for a purpose
other than the direct benefit of the beneficiary, and particularly
so that said funds will not be diverted from the purpose of support
and education of said beneficiary.
5.
To determine whether and to what extent receipts
should be deemed income or principal, whether or to what extent
expenditures should be charged against principal or income, and
what other adjustments should be made between principal and income,
provided such adjustments do not conflict with well-settled rules
for the determination of principal and income questions.
G. To delegate powers to agents including accountants,
investment counsel, appraisers, legal counsel, and other experts,
remunerate them and pay their expenses; to employ custodians of the
Trust assets, bookkeepers, clerks, and other assistants and pay
them out of income or principal.
7. To renew, assign, alter, extend, compromise, release,
with or without consideration, or submit to arbitration or
litigation, obligations or claims held by or asserted against the
Undersigned, the Trustees, or the Trust assets.
8. To borrow money, from others or from the Trustees for
the payment of taxes, debts, or expenses, or for any other purpose,
which in the opinion of the Trustees, will facilitate the
administration of these trusts, and pledge or mortgage property as
security for any such loans; and, if money is borrowed from any
Trustee, individually, to pay interest thereon at the thenprevailing rate of interest.
9. To lease, or grant options to lease, for periods to
begin presently or in the future, without regard to statutory
restrictions or the probable duration of any trust; to erect or
alter buildings or otherwise improve and manage property; demolish
buildings; make ordinary and extra-ordinary repairs; grant
easements and charges; make party wall contracts; dedicate roads,
subdivide; adjust boundary lines; partition and convey property or
give money for equity of partition; to be either a generdT or
limited partner.
10.
To enter into transactions with any other trust in
which the Undersigned or the beneficiaries of this Trust Agreement,
11

or any of them, have beneficial interests, even though any Trustee
of such other trust is also a Trustee under this Trust Agreement.
11.
To exercise all the foregoing powers alone or in
conjunction witli others, even though any of the Trustees are
personally
interested
in
the
property
that
is
involved,
notwithstanding any rules of law relating to divided loyalty or
self-dealing.
12.
The Trustees may engage in the practice of writing
options on all recognized exchanges to buy, sell, and trade in
securities of any nature, (including "short" sales) on margin, and
for such purposes may maintain and operate margin accounts with
brokersf and may pledge any securities held or purchased by them
with such brokers as security for loans and advances made to the
Trustees.
B.
at

any

Any Trustee may decline to act or may resign as Trustee
time

by

delivering

a

wj'itten

resignation

to

the

beneficiaries of a trust then subsisting.
C.

From the income of the trusts hereby created, or, if that

be insufficient, from the principaJ thereof, the Trustees shall pay
and discharge all expenses incurred

in the administration of the

Trusts.
D.

No successor Trustee shall be liable for any misfeasance

of any prior Trustee.
ARTICLE) IX
Additions to Trust
A.

The Undersigned or any other person may grant, a^rd the

Trustees may receive, as part of this Trust, additional real and
personal

property,

by

assignment,

transfer,

deed,

or

other

conveyance, or by any other means, testamentary or inter vivos, for
inclusion

in the Trust herein created.

Any

such property

received by the Trustees shail become a part of the Trust into

12

so

which it is transferred and shall become subject to the terms of
t±JLs Acreerae n t.
MITICLE X
Delegation of Authority
During

physical

or mental

incapacitation,

the

Undersigned

herein appoints, the next successor Trustee succeed to his place,
during said period of incapacitation, either as Trustee, Executor,
or in any other legal capacity, whether appointed, orally or in
writing, and to supervise all matters in which the Undersigned had
the

right

to

act

if

he

had

not

become

incapacitated.

Incapacitation shall be established either by a court of competent
jurisdiction or by a written statement filed with the Trustees and
signed

in

good

faith

by

two

(2) physicians

unrelated

to

the

Undersigned.
ARTICLE XI
Parties Dealing with Trustees
No purchaser, and no issuer of any stock, bond, or other
instrument evidencing a deposit of money or property, or other
person dealing with

the Trustees hereunder with respect to

any

propert}' hereunder as purchaser, lessee, party to a contract or
lease, or in any other capacity whatsoever, shall be under any
obligation whatsoever to see to the disbursing of money paid to the
Trustees or to the due execution of this Trust in any particular,
but such persons shall be absolutely free in dealing
with the Trustees on the same basis as though the Trustees were the

13

absolute

owners

of

the said property, without

any conditions,

restrictions, or qualifications whatsoever.
ARTICLE XII
^Pjyz^e_££jyJ^^

Property;

All property conveyed or transferred to the Trustees or now
held by the Trustees pursuant to this Trust Agreement that was the
separate property of the Undersigned at the time of such conveyance
or transfer, shall remain, respectively, the separate property of
the Undersigned

who

transferred

such property

to the Trustees.

Accordingly, while the Undersigned is alive, the Trustees shall pay
to the Undersigned only the .income or principal from his separate
property that he contributed to this Trust.
ARTICLE XIII
Revocation and Amendment
A.

As long as the Undersigned

is alive, he reserves the

right, without the consent or approval of any other, to amend,
modify, revoke, or remove from this Trust the property that he has
contributed, in whole or in part, including the principal and the
present or past undisbursed income from such principal.

On the

death of the Undersigned, the remainder oC the Trust Estate, and
the trusts created hereinafter, may not be amended, revoked, or
terminated, other than by disposition of the trust property to the
beneficiaries according to the terms stated herein.
B.

While

the

Undersigned

is

alive, he

shall

have

full

authority, in his discretion, to sell, convey, or mortgage property
in his own name, without disclosing his capacity as Trustee of this
14

Trust

Agreement;

any

such

sale

or

conveyance

of

property

in

accordance with this provision, shall be considered as, and shall
cause,

a partial

revocation

of

the Trust with

respect

to

the

property so conveyed or sold, and shall be sufficient to remove
said property from the Trust.

YesJ^ecLilik?JL?J5JL^^
The interest of the beneficiaries is a present vested interest
which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated
other than by death.

_JP.Y. -LVIli I?_SJ _ b a

w

This Agreement shall be construed and regulated by the laws of
the state of residence of the Undersigned.
ARTICLE XVI
Last Instructions
During

any

serious

illness,

or

at

the

death,

of

the

Undersigned, the Undersigned requests that the Trustees call his
attorney, DEL B. ROWE, of 535 West 500 South, Gateway Plaza #300,
Bountiful,

Utah

84010,

(801)

298-0(540,

or

another

attorney

specializing in Estate Planning, to obtain instructions regarding
the settlement of his estate.
ARTICLE XVII
Settlement of the Undersigned's Estate
This Trust Agreement has been prepared in duplicate, one copy
of which has been executed

as an original and the other is a

r»
photocopy

of

the

unexecuted

original,

retained

in

the

above

attorneys office. Either copy may be used as an original without
the other; if only one copy of this Trust Agreement can be found,
then it shall be considered as the original, and the missing copy
will

be

presumed

inadvertently

lost.

Any

clarifications

or

instructions concerning this Trust Agreement may be obtained by
calling the above named attorney, DDL D. ROWE of Bountiful, Utah,
who

is

requested

to do

everything

necessary

to

implement

the

provisions of this Trust Agreement, who also retains an unexecuted
copy of the foregoing.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned has executed this Trust

7

Agreement on the

,\J CJ J - , 19 9 3.

day oL

IUCflARD^D. SNOW

STATE OF UTAH
ss

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

w,

?

day- of — •
. . On this
°^ •
' 1993, personally appeared
n r before me RICHARD D. SNOW, who acknowledged to me that he executed
the foregoing Trust Agreement.
,.
, •'

4

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 04-27-96

NOTARY PUBLICSRESIDING AT DAVIS COUNTY
<s^%yt)

I /^>^<^\

Nnfjity f t J '••;

KAMAM
OMNIA
.vo\n/\ri Vv ''OMNIA

Stnta of Ufnli

*

ff

J
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AMENDMENT TO THE
RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST

By

SA

^'LAKE COUNTY
3eauly Cieri

The Undersigned, RICHARD D. SNOW, Grantor, hereby amends THE
RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST, established the 8th day of November,
1993, as follows:
ARTICLE VII
Trustees
A.

The following people will act as trustees in the

following order of succession:
FIRST: RICHARD D. SNOW is to act solely as the Trustee
of THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST.
SECOND:
Upon the death or inability to function of
RICHARD D. SNOW, then RUBY WOMACK shall act solely as Trustee of
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST.
THIRD: Upon the death or incapacitation of RUBY WOMACK,
then MARCIA SNOW shall act solely as Trustee of THE RICHARD D. SNOW
FAMILY TRUST.
FOURTH:
A Trustee chosen by a majority of the
beneficiaries, with a parent or legal guardian voting for minor
beneficiaries; provided, however, that the issue of any deceased
child shall have collectively only one vote.
****SPECIAL PROVISIONS****
UPON THE DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED, THIS TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE
DISTRIBUTED AS FOLLOWS:
1.
RUBY WOMACK MAY LIVE IN THE MOBILE HOME, GUREDON, AS LONG
AS SHE DESIRES OR UNTIL SHE REMARRIES OR SHE DIES.

2.
GRANTOR
WOMACK.

THE 1995 CHEVROLET CUSTOM VAN (OR WHATEVER VEHICLE THE
OWNS AT HIS DEATH) SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO RUBY

3.
THE REMAINDER OF THE TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE HELD IN TRUST
TO PROVIDE RUBY WOMACK WITH INCOME.
RUBY SHALL HAVE COMPLETE
DISCRETION IN THE USE OF THE TRUST ESTATE.

4.
PATRICIA SPROUSE SHALL NOT RECEIVE ANYTHING FROM THIS
TRUST ESTATE AS SHE ALREADY RECEIVED HER SHARE PRIOR TO THE
UNDERSIGNED'S DEATH, INCLUDING:
A)

1 9 6 5 FORD

B)

197 6 FORD TIIUNDERBIRD

C)

19 8 1 PONTIAC,

D) 1987 FORD RANGER PICKUP TRUCK,
E) PAYMENT OF HER AND HER HUSBAND'S DEBTS IN THE
AMOUNT OF APPROXIMATELY TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS
($20,000), AND
F) SHIRLEY SNOW'S RINGS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS
WORTH
APPROXIMATELY
TWENTY
THOUSAND
DOLLARS
($20,000).
THESE ABOVE SPECIAL PROVISIONS SUPERSEDE ALL OTHERS IN THIS
TRUST.
CATASTROPHIC ILLNESS PROVISION
THIS PROVISION IS HEREBY REVOKED IN WHOLE AND SHALL NO LONGER
CONTROL THE DETERMINATION OF THIS TRUST ESTATE.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned has executed this Trust
Amendment on the

^-S?
RICHARD

f5

day of

^(?(cftva?f

, 19 95.

o J>D. SNOW

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

^7C^</

)
: ss
)

On this
IS
day of 6^>trmfcpf
r 1995, personally
appeared before me RICHARD D. SNOW, who duly acknowledged to me
that he executed the foregoing
oing Trusl
TrustiAmendment.
~

-H-97

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 04<

llirkJfiySaLtovi1^ l a d e

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County
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gCHEDULE "A"
gTNftTRUCTIONS TO THE LIVING TRUST
5*BRE INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRANSFERRING INDIVIDUAL ASSETS
ORS INTO THE TRUST.
gBTflftggE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF YOUR LIVING TRUST. YOUR TRUST
ffl»BE FUNDED WITH YOUR ASSETS IN ORDER TO OPERATE PROPERLY,
TF, THESE ITEMS ARE NOT PROPERLY TRANSFERRED INTO THE TRUST THEY MAY
STILL BE SUBJECT TO P R O B A T E T
**** Please follow each set of instructions carefully. We have
first indicated how to transfer each item to the trust and then
given you an area to list each of the items in the separate areas.
****
We advise you to complete these lists as thoroughly as
possible as they will be very helpful for successor trustees in
locating the items and accounts as well as a check list to make
sure that you have completed the transfers.
**** Do not hesitate to call the attorney or a legal assistant if
you have any questions about these procedures,
**** Since you are the grantor and the beneficiary of this trust
agreement during your lifetime, and the trust income is the same as
your personal income (which you report on your personal income tax
returns), then no special IRS election or return is required for
the trust during your lifetime. Therefore, your social security
numbers may still be used as identification on these accounts.
Whenever this trust becomes irrevocable, you (or your successor
trustees) should contact an accountant or tax attorney for
information on any necessary changes.
*••* From this date forward your assets should be acquired with
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST as legal owner of the assets
(except for automobiles and personal property). This is usually
donevTDy putting the following statement on the assets:
[RICHARD D. SNOW AS TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE
ti^KARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST.

**** It is a good idea to keep your documents in a safe deposit
box or safe. To help in keeping your trust currently funded, a
copy of this schedule should be kept handy at home.
After
initially completing your asset transfers and asset listings, you
should update and review your trust, and more particularly your
SCHEDULE "A" annually, perhaps each year when filing taxes• This
will insure that nothing has been left out of the trust for tb^t
year.
**** When completing asset transfers, you may use the letters
provided. If there are not enough letters you may make as many
copies of the letters as you need, but be sure to copy them before
signing them. A transfer letter will require an original signature
to be valid.
**** We also suggest keeping a copy of your completed and signed
transfer letters in the event a letter is lost or destroyed before
the transfer is effectuated.
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»v

REAL PROPERTY AMD
REAL PROPERTY CONTRACTS
AL PROPERTY
hL PROPERTY MUST UK TRANSFERRED TO THE TRUST HY LEuAL DEED.
DEED EACH PIECE OF REAL PROPERTY FROM THE GRANTOR (BE SURE TO
L -)i'?. FHLT. LEGA1' H W F r'15 '''^v *>•<• i e n IHI i.wr.M.- ...r.
"RICHARD

D.

SNOW,

TRUSTEE

OR

TRUSTEES OF THE RICHARD I). SNOW FAM

'"""
r»

LESi^ UttEDS MUST BE RECORDED WiTU THE COUNTY RECORDER I
1QPERTY ADDRESS OR LOCATION

DATE RECORDED

-fl-

L PROPERTY CONTRACTS
.. .
-. v-uitnuii. .' •« I.VLI. I
JU AKL
ta-'.^-NG
. S F'.R, YOU MUST MAKF AN ASS, .
. E PAYML.'.-- TO THE
. AS WELL AS QUIT (LAIM DEEDING THE PROPERTY T> THE TRUST A
Jn OF All ASSIGNMENT CAN RF OBTAINEr "POM '!'• \ ?,T )PNEY
- :\\\ .
:CTION T^ APPLICABLE TO YOUR m n r t r *t
)NTwi>.i J L ^ K i F ' i i o n

'.A^Jh

~MxXA/ £Z

DATE OF ASSIGNMENT

V

BANK, CREDIT UNION OR SAVINGS & LOAN ACCOUNTS
AND SAFE DEPOSIT BOXES
EaftUKWFCRBDIT'UNION OR SAVINGS & LOAN ACCOUNTS
'C^ERSHIP OF YOUR BANK, CREDIT UNION OR SAVINGS & LOAN CHECKING
NGS/ACCOUNTS SHOULD BE OWNED BY THE TRUST, SO THAT IN THE
:tif$DEATH THE TRUST IS A LEGAL OWNER AND THE TRUSTEES MAY HAVE
TO!'THESE ACCOUNTS.
ffiffijtDO^NOT! NEED TO HAVE NEW CHECKS PRINTED OR CHANGE THE NAME OF
EOT£ACC0UNT,, SIMPLY INSTRUCT THE BANK TO ADD THE TRUST THE OWNER
B§§|)BXIjSTING' ACCOUNTS. PLEASE SEE EXAMPLE LETTER 1 PROVIDED, WHICH
[^JJPlE^.PRESENTED TO YOUR BANK, CREDIT UNION OR SAVINGS & LOAN
^ASSOCIATION AND INSTRUCTS THEM IN THE PROPER TERMINOLOGY TO USE IN
i§!H%TRANSFER. THIS TRANSFER SHOULD SIMPLY BE THE COMPLETION OF A
JNEWt'SiGNATURE CARD.
NAME OF INSTITUTION

NAME/TYPE & ACCOUNT NUMBER DATE OF TRANSFER

SAFE DEPOSIT BOX
THE OWNERSHIP OF YOUR SAFE DEPOSIT BOX NEEDS TO BE SHARED WITH THE
TRUST, SO THAT IN THE EVENT OF DEATH, THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY
TRUST IS A LEGAL OWNER AND THE TRUSTEES MAY HAVE ACCESS TO THIS
SAFE BOX. ADD RICHARD D. SNOW, TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES AS A
JOINT TENANT ON YOUR SAFE DEPOSIT BOX BUT BE SURE THAT YOUR
SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES CAN GET IN THE BOX, ESPECIALLY IF YOU HAVE
PLACED YOUR TRUST IN THE BOX 1
NAME OF BANKS OR INSTITUTIONS

SAFE BOX #

ASQAJ'tf

iii

DATE OF TRANSFER

^^^QCT^OJI^^IIOI
C , D , f S ) NMl
Tn

•

CHECKING ACCT. NO. / J ^ V ^ o , -^=

ti£S.AlU*_.Lk^JjJm^UAME

'

^

OTHER ACCOUNTS:

OF BANK, CREDIT UNION OR S & L)

I have established a Revocable Livina Trn^t- on *->,«

^- J

account («o nnst be change! '
•'• :J. SNJW, AS TRUSTEE OF THE RICHART «
19

-2J2L_-

—J^--

-NOW FAMILY

•. ^>_r^ frg^__,

As this trust will now provide a successor to this account it
- monger necessary to have anyone el K P nn Z\ •
docuuuL, xL
n t h i s acc
-se remove all n t w T , ™ ^ *
JL
°unt with me.
stated al^ve? accordina t o ! L T J h e 8 e a c c o u n ^ other than as
^ H 0 0 ^ e x i s t i n g tax laws, my social sec; r ^ ^ x
identification number for the «VuV
'
^
lerxfxcat.on that this transaction has b e V ^ p l e t e d ^ *
n„

Thank you for your help in this matter.
DATED this _ _ £ _

day of

^

^

^

1993 _

Sincerely,

BANK, CREDIT UNION OR SAVTN

J.K^^EP 1
" *,0AN INSTRUCTION LETTER

^
^ " ^

SECURITY, FINANCIAL AND/OR BROKERAGE ACCOUNTS,
DIVIDEND REINVESTMENT ACCOUNTS AND STOCK CERTIFICATES

THESE ACCOUNTS SHOULD BE OWNED BY YOUR FAMILY TRUST.
PLEASE
INSTRUCT THE BROKER TO MAKE THE TRUST THE NEW OWNER OF YOUR PRESENT
ACCOUNT. YOU MAY PRESENT EXAMPLE LETTER 2 TO YOUR BROKER WHICH
INSTRUCTS THEM IN THE PROPER' TERMINOLOGY TO USE IN THE TRANSFER.
THIS SHOULD ALSO BE DONE FOR DIVIDEND REINVESTMENT ACCOUNTS. IF
YOUR PARTICULAR BROKER REQUIRES A COPY OF YOUR TRUST, THEN COPY
ONLY UP TO THE SIGNATURE PAGE.
SCHEDULE "A" IS A PERSONAL
ACCOUNTING AND SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED.
NAME/TYPE & ACCOUNT NUMBER

BROKERAGE FIRM

DATE OF TRANSFER

=rf=
STOCKS
IF YOU HAVE ACTUAL STOCK CERTIFICATES, CONTACT YOUR BROKER,
TRANSFER A.GENT, OR THE COMPANY THAT ISSUED THE STOCK AND REQUEST
THAT IT BE REISSUED IN THE NAME OF YOUR TRUST: RICHARD D. SNOW
TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST.
IF YOU DO NOT HAVE CERTIFICATES PLEASE FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR
SECURITIES & BROKERAGE ACCOUNTS ABOVE.
NAME/TYPE & NUMBER OF SHARES

DATE OF TRANSFER

f%5

fNAMI*

f i r T\P\1} \> r

i n> K i j ' M )

„JB>:« SNOW, TRUSTEE

jt^abjishew .. Revocal i e ;.; , i..;
.. "sting- s e c u r i t i e s .
ij.neincia
.:..
y o u r finm i n t o my T r u s : . . P l e a s e maks
ESSS:Pfffiny acrourr- -v y - ; r '
.* -ii.-.w

[.provide v e r i f i c a t i o n

*

tJ t j b ... J. ^

L O

brokerage

. . SNOW FAMILY TRUST I.l/A
1

DAY;OF

, .«

Q ', 7

-en

day of

RlCHARD|D;tSNOW

LK q i T y P

SECURITIES,. FlNAMi LAI

AI Hi

n BROKERAGE ACCOUNTS

«>

LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES

LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
CONTACT YOUR LIFE INSURANCE CARRIER BY SENDING EXAMPLE LETTER AND
REQUEST A "CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY".
YOU MUST CHANGE THE FIRST
BENEFICIARY TO: TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE RICHARD D.
SNOW FAMILY TRUST.
YOU MAY PRESENT EXAMPLE LETTER 3 TO THE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
WHICH WILL INSTRUCT THEM AS TO THE CORRECT TERMINOLOGY IN MAKING
THIS CHANGE.
IF YOU HAVE A LIFE INSURANCE WITH FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE
INSURANCE PLEASE REQUEST A SPECIAL FORM FROM YOUR PERSONNEL OFFICE.
NAME/POLICY NUMBER & TYPE

3 o pJ?/M£AJT

& /?<}/
s

£UV

A,re

VALUE

^ona

nn

9#06
/?o

DlJcj

FT

?T^///AS<I

DATE OF TRANSFER

^ - AJauQM b PAL

1993

ACCOUNT OR POLICY N O .

TO AJfi7k)fJ & I See VtCe

As f7^

iMFE

T^SURAirF

COMPANY)

I h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d a R e v o c a b l e .A\
K_ i i
. the
<g?
day
of
AJasiZ+th CK
19 5 5 r and l e s i r e t< -Jhango t . \ e f i r s t b e n e f i c i a r y
o f my l i f e i n s u r a n c e po.,1 I c j r ' i F* %
••• : as follows:
TRUSTEE OR SUCCESi
D . SNOW F AM II .1 TK*

l

.r?

^

f

! il- u I CHARD

Because I have established,, successoi --•.-*•
no alternate beneficiary will be require
If necessary, please send m"
effectuate this char lge
Please
transact ion has been completed.
"

-

,

*:.- a; ;>: priat - 4 :.. - *o
ie vei : 4 .*ati-r: t.ha- < '..
~'

Thank you :i n advance for y oiu assistance .

':.:. .stt.fr

SincRrely,

V Ji***'

D. SNOW

LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
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(LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY)

I have established a Revocable Living Trust on the
°f AJb\J fMheiL. i 19 c5t3.r anci desire to change the first beneficiary
of my life insurance policy(ies) with you to read as follows:
TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE RICHARD
D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST.

Because I have established successor trustees of this Trust,
no alternate beneficiary will be required.
If necessary, please send me the appropriate forms to
effectuate this change. Please provide verification that this
transaction has been completed.
Thank you in advance for your assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,

RICHARD D. SNOW

<Ti/

LETTER 3
LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES

PENSIONS. ANNUITIES AND I-R&rBCCggBTS

PENSIONS. ANNUITIES AND IRA ACCOUNTS
PLEASE CHANGE THE BENEFICIARY OF THESE ACCOUNTS TO: THE RICHARD D.
SNOW FAMILY TRUST.
YOU MAY PRESENT EXAMPLE LETTER 4 TO THE FIRMS THAT MAINTAIN THESE
ACCOUNTS, WHICH WILL INSTRUCT THEM AS TO THE PROPER TERMINOLOGY IN
MAKING THIS CHANGE.
NAME/TYPE & ACCOUNT NUMBER

VALUE

DATE OF TRANSFER

POLICY NO.

TO

__:

(LIFE

COMPANY)

I have established a Revocable Living Trust on the
day
of
, 19
, and desire to change the first beneficiary
of my life
policy(ies) with you to read as follows:
TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE
FAMILY TRUST.

Because I have established successor trustees of this Trust,
no alternate beneficiary will be required.
If necessary, please send me the appropriate forms to
effectuate this change. Please provide verification that this
transaction has been completecTT
'
'
Thank you in advance for your assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,

LETTER 3

BUSINESS ". KTERFSTS . TAPTN™'"!
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, .^-CEIVABLES
AND BONDS

BUSINESS INTERESTS, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS & OTHER CONTRACTS. NOTES
& RECEIVABLES
COMPLETE A TRANSFER AGREEMENT AND ASSIGNMENT TRANSFERRING ALL SUCH
INTERESTS TO THE TRUST.
SEE ATTORNEY FOR SPECIAL FORMS IN
COMPLETING THESE TRANSFERS.
NAME & TYPE OF INTEREST OR NOTE

VALUE

DATE OF TRANSFER

j^±

BONDS
BONDS CAN BE CASHED IN AT MATURITY ..'; . .... ,-, . ,u TRUSTEE .^ --^
RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST, HOWEVER, THE TRUSTEE MUST PROVIDE THE
TREASURY DEPARTMENT WITH A COPY OF THE FRONT PAKE, TRUSTEE PAGE &
SIGNATURE PAGE OF THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY Tirjrr. EXISTING BONDS
DO NOT NEED TO BE CHANGED, HOWEVER WHEN F'lRCF.A.'-'ING NEW BONDS YOU
SHOULD DO SO IN THE NAME OF THE TRUST.
BOND/TYPE NUMBER & VALUE
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"LETTER OF DISPOSITION OF PERSONAL EFFECTS"
OF RICHARD D. SNOW
AN APPENDAGE TO THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST
'WHICH BY REFERENCE IS MADE A PART THEREOF
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"LETTER OF DISPOSITION OF PERSONAL EFFECTS"
OF RICHARD D. SNOW
AN APPENDAGE TO THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST
WHICH BY REFERENCE IS MADE A PART THEREOF
In
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with

Article

III, Subparagraph

B

of

the

foregoing Trust Agreement The Undersigned hereby bequeaths to the
following named persons the following personal effects listed
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RICHARD,D. SNOW

Addendum

75-1-201. General definitions.
Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent chapters that are applicable to
specific chapters, parts, or sections, and unless the context otherwise requires, in this code:
(1) "Agent" includes an attorney-in-fact under a durable or nondurable power of attorney, an
individual authorized to make decisions concerning another's health care, and an individual
authorized to make decisions for another under a natural death act.
(2) "Application" means a written request to the registrar for an order of informal probate or
appointment under Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 3, Informal Probate and Appointment Proceedings.
(3) "Beneficiary," as it relates to trust beneficiaries, includes a person who has any present or
future interest, vested or contingent, and also includes the owner of an interest by assignment or other
transfer; as it relates to a charitable trust, includes any person entitled to enforce the trust; as it relates
to a "beneficiary of a beneficiary designation," refers to a beneficiary of an insurance or annuity
policy, of an account with POD designation, of a security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), or of
a pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, or other nonprobate transfer at death;
and, as it relates to a "beneficiary designated in a governing instrument," includes a grantee of a deed,
a devisee, a trust beneficiary, a beneficiary of a beneficiary designation, a donee, appointee, or taker
in default of a power of appointment, and a person in whose favor a power of attorney or a power
held in any individual, fiduciary, or representative capacity is exercised.
(4) "Beneficiary designation" refers to a governing instrument naming a beneficiary of an
insurance or annuity policy, of an account with POD designation, of a security registered in
beneficiary form (TOD), or of a pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, or other
nonprobate transfer at death.
(5) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child under this code by intestate
succession from the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes any person who is only a
stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote descendant.
(6) "Claims,'' in respect to estates of decedents and protected persons, includes liabilities of the
decedent or protected person, whether arising in contract, in tort, or otherwise, and liabilities of the
estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent or after the appointment of a conservator,
including funeral expenses and expenses of administration. "Claims" does not include estate or
inheritance taxes, or demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific
assets alleged to be included in the estate.
(7) "Conservator" means a person who is appointed by a court to manage the estate of a protected
person.
(8) "Court" means any of the courts of record in this state having jurisdiction in matters relating to
the affairs of decedents.
(9) "Descendant" of an individual means all of his descendants of all generations, with the
relationship of parent and child at each generation being determined by the definition of child and
parent contained in this title.
(10) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamentary disposition of real or personal property
and, when used as a verb, means to dispose of real or personal property by will.
(11) "Devisee" means any person designated in a will to receive a devise. For the purposes of Title
75, Chapter 3, Probate of Wills and Administration, in the case of a devise to an existing trust or
trustee, or to a trustee in trust described by will, the trust or trustee is the devisee,
and the beneficiaries are not devisees.
(12) "Disability" means cause for a protective order as described by Section 75-5-401.
(13) "Distributee" means any person who has received property of a decedent from his personal
representative other than as a creditor or purchaser. A testamentary trustee is a distributee only to the
extent of distributed assets or increment thereto remaining in his hands. A beneficiary of a
testamentary trust to whom the trustee has distributed property received from a personal
representative is a distributee of the personal representative. For purposes of this provision,
"testamentary trustee" includes a trustee to whom assets are transferred by will, to the extent of the
devised assets.
(14) "Estate" includes the property of the decedent, trust, or other person whose affairs are subject
to this title as originally constituted and as it exists from time to time during administration.
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(15) "Exempt property" means that property of a decedent's estate which is described in Section
75-2-403.
(16) "Fiduciary" includes a personal representative, guardian, conservator, and trustee.
(17) "Foreign personal representative" means a personal representative of another jurisdiction.
(18) "Formal proceedings" means proceedings conducted before a judge with notice to interested
persons.
(19) "Governing instrument" means a deed, will, trust, insurance or annuity policy, account with
POD designation, security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), pension, profit-sharing, retirement,
or similar benefit plan, instrument creating or exercising a power of appointment or a power of
attorney, or a dispositive, appointive, or nominative instrument of any similar type.
(20) "Guardian" means a person who has qualified as a guardian of a minor or incapacitated
person pursuant to testamentary or court appointment, but excludes one who is merely a guardian ad
litem.
(21) "Heirs," except as controlled by Section 75-2-711, means persons, including the surviving
spouse and state, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a
decedent.
(22) "Incapacitated person" means any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental
deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause,
except minority, to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate
responsible decisions.
(23) "Informal proceedings" mean those conducted without notice to interested persons by an
officer of the court acting as a registrar for probate of a will or appointment of a personal
representative.
(24) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, and
any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward,
or protected person. It also includes persons having priority for appointment as personal
representative and other fiduciaries representing interested persons. The meaning as it relates to
particular persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular
purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding.
(25) "Issue" of a person means descendant as defined in Subsection (9).
(26) "Joint tenants with the right of survivorship" and "community property with the
right of survivorship" includes coowners of property held under circumstances that entitle one or
more to the whole of the property on the death of the other or others, but excludes forms of
coownership registration in which the underlying ownership of each party is in proportion to that
party's contribution.
(27) "Lease" includes an oil, gas, or other mineral lease.
(28) "Letters" includes letters testamentary, letters of guardianship, letters of administration, and
letters of conservatorship.
(29) "Minor" means a person who is under 18 years of age.
(30) "Mortgage" means any conveyance, agreement, or arrangement in which property is used as
security.
(31) "Nonresident decedent" means a decedent who was domiciled in another jurisdiction at the
time of his death.
(32) "Organization" includes a corporation, limited liability company, business trust, estate, trust,
partnership, joint venture, association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or any
other legal or commercial entity.
(33) "Parent" includes any person entitled to take, or who would be entitled to take if the child
died without a will, as a parent under this code by intestate succession from the child whose
relationship is in question and excludes any person who is only a stepparent, foster parent, or
grandparent.
(34) "Payor" means a trustee, insurer, business entity, employer, government, governmental
agency or subdivision, or any other person authorized or obligated by law or a governing instrument
to make payments.
(35) "Person" means an individual or an organization.
(36) (a) "Personal representative" includes executor, administrator, successor personal
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representative, special administrator, and persons who perform substantially the same function under
the law governing their status.
(b) "General personal representative" excludes special administrator.
(37) "Petition" means a written request to the court for an order after notice.
(38) "Proceeding" includes action at law and suit in equity.
(39) "Property" includes both real and personal property or any interest therein and means
anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(40) "Protected person" means a person for whom a conservator has been appointed. A "minor
protected person" means a minor for whom a conservator has been appointed because of minority.
(41) "Protective proceeding" means a proceeding described in Section 75-5-401.
(42) "Registrar" refers to the official of the court designated to perform the functions of registrar
as provided in Section 75-1-307.
(43) "Security" includes any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest, or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in
payments out of production under such a title or lease, collateral trust certificate, transferable share,
voting trust certificate, and, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a security, or
any certificate of interest or participation, any temporary or interim certificate, receipt, or certificate
of deposit for, or any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
(44) "Settlement," in reference to a decedent's estate, includes the full process of
administration, distribution, and closing.
(45) "Special administrator" means a personal representative as described in Sections 75-3-614
through 75-3-618.
(46) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(47) "Successor personal representative" means a personal representative, other than a special
administrator, who is appointed to succeed a previously appointed personal representative.
(48) "Successors" means persons, other than creditors, who are entitled to property of a decedent
under the decedent's will or this title.
(49) "Supervised administration" refers to the proceedings described in Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 5,
Supervised Administration.
(50) "Survive," except for purposes of Part 3 of Article VI, Uniform TOD Security Registration
Act, means that an individual has neither predeceased an event, including the death of another
individual, nor is considered to have predeceased an event under Section 75-2-104 or 75-2-702. The
term includes its derivatives, such as "survives," "survived," "survivor," and "surviving."
(51) "Testacy proceeding" means a proceeding to establish a will or determine intestacy.
(52) "Testator" includes an individual of either sex.
(53) "Trust" includes any express trust, private or charitable, with additions thereto, wherever and
however created. The term also includes a trust created or determined by judgment or decree under
which the trust is to be administered in the manner of an express trust. The term excludes other
constructive trusts, and it excludes resulting trusts, conservatorships, personal representatives, trust
accounts as defined in Title 75, Chapter 6, Nonprobate Transfers, custodial arrangements pursuant to
any Uniform Transfers To Minors Act, business trusts providing for certificates to be issued to
beneficiaries, common trust funds, voting trusts, preneed funeral plans under Title 58, Chapter 58,
Preneed Funeral Arrangement Act, security arrangements, liquidation trusts, and trusts for the
primary purpose of paying debts, dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee
benefits of any kind, and any arrangement under which a person is nominee or escrowee for another.
(54) "Trustee" includes an original, additional, or successor trustee, whether or not appointed or
confirmed by the court.
(55) "Ward" means a person for whom a guardian has been appointed. A "minor ward" is a minor
for whom a guardian has been appointed solely because of minority.
(56) "Will" includes codicil and any testamentary instrument which merely appoints an executor,
revokes or revises another will, nominates a guardian, or expressly excludes or limits the right of an
individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession.
Amended by Chapter 142, 1999 General Session

75-2-402

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
ily allowance out of estate of his deceased father, 12 A.L.R.3d 1140.
Key Numbers. — Homestead «=> 134.

minor children as affected by, 6 A.L.R.3d 1387.
Waiver of right to widow's allowance by postnuptial agreement, 9 A.L.R.3d 1319.
Illegitimate child, eligibility to receive fam-

75-2-402. Exempt property — Amount.
In addition to the homestead allowance, the surviving spouse of a decedent
who was domiciled in this state is entitled from the estate to value not exceeding $5,000 in excess of any security interests therein in household furniture,
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects. If there is no surviving spouse, children of the decedent are entitled jointly to the same value.
If encumbered chattels are selected and if the value in excess of security
interests, plus that of other exempt property, is less than $5,000, or if there is
not $5,000 worth of exempt property in the estate, the spouse or children are
entitled to other assets of the estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up
the $5,000 value. Rights to exempt property and assets needed to make up a
deficiency of exempt property have priority over all claims against the estate,
except reasonable funeral expenses, and the right to any assets to make up a
deficiency of exempt property shall abate as necessary to permit prior payment of the reasonable funeral expenses, homestead allowance, and family
allowance. These rights are in addition to any benefit or share passing to the
surviving spouse or children by intestate succession, but is chargeable against
any share passing by the will of the decedent unless the will provides otherwise.
History: C. 1953, 75-2-402, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, § 3; 1988, ch. 110, § 4.
Editorial Board Comment. — Unlike the
exempt values described in §§ 75-2-401 and
75-2-403, the exempt values described in this
section are available in a case where the decedent left no spouse but left only adult children.
The possible difference between beneficiaries
of the exemptions described by §§ 75-2-401
and 75-2-403, and this section, explain the provision in this section which establishes priorities.

Section 75-2-204 covers waiver of exempt
property rights, and § 75-2-206 covers the
question of whether a decedent's will may put
a spouse to an election with reference to exemptions.
Cross-References. — Effect of divorce, annulment and decree of separation, § 75-2-803.
Waiver of rights by surviving spouse,
§ 75-2-204.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
widow her exempt property claim from multiple-party accounts in the name of the decedent's daughter where the estate was insufficient to satisfy the claim. In re Estate of
Wagley, 760 P.2d 316 (Utah 1988).

ANALYSIS

Insufficiency of estate.
—Multiple-party accounts.
Insufficiency of estate.
—Multiple-party accounts.
It was error for the probate court to deny the

50

75-2-405. Source, determination, and documentation.
(1) If the estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically devised may not be used to satisfy
rights to homestead allowance or exempt property. Subject to this restriction, the surviving spouse,
guardians of minor children, or children who are adults may select property of the estate as
homestead allowance and exempt property. The personal representative may make those selections if
the surviving spouse, the children, or the guardians of the minor children are unable or fail to do so
within a reasonable time or there is no guardian of a minor child. The personal representative may
execute an instrument or deed of distribution to establish the ownership of property taken as
homestead allowance or exempt property. The personal representative may determine the family
allowance in a lump sum not exceeding $18,000 or periodic installments not exceeding $1,500 per
month for one year, and may disburse funds of the estate in payment of the family allowance and any
part of the homestead allowance payable in cash. The personal representative or an interested person
aggrieved by any selection, determination, payment, proposed payment, or failure to act under this
section may petition the court for appropriate relief, which may include a family allowance other than
that which the personal representative determined or could have determined.
(2) If the right to an elective share is exercised on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an
incapacitated person, the personal representative may add any unexpended portions payable under the
homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance to the trust established under
Subsection 75-2-212(2).
Enacted by Chapter 39, 1998 General Session
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75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims. (1) All claims against a decedent's estate which
arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision of it, whether
due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the
personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier
of the following dates:
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) for creditors who are given actual notice,
and where notice is published, within the time provided in Subsection 75-3-801 (1) for all claims
barred by publication.
(2) In all events, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's domicile are also barred in
this state.
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent,
including claims of the state and any of its subdivisions, whether due or to become due, absolute or
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis are barred
against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless
presented as follows:
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal representative within three months after
performance by the personal representative is due; or
(b) any other claim within the later of three months after it arises, or the time specified in
Subsection (l)(a).
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
(a) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon property of the estate;
(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability of the
decedent or the personal representative for which he is protected by liability insurance; or
(c) collection of compensation for services rendered and reimbursement for expenses advanced by
the personal representative or by the attorney or accountant for the personal representative of the
estate.
Amended by Chapter 179, 1992 General Session
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75-7-402. Powers of trustees conferred by this part. (1) From time of creation of the trust until
final distribution of the assets of the trust, a trustee has the power to perform, without court
authorization, every act which a prudent man would perform for the purposes of the trust, including
the powers specified in Subsection (3).
(2) In the exercise of his powers, including the powers granted by this part, a trustee has a duty to
act with due regard to his obligation as a fiduciary, according to the standard set forth in Section 757-302.
(3) A trustee has the power, subject to Subsections (1) and (2) to:
(a) collect, hold, and retain trust assets received from a trustor until, in the judgment of the trustee,
disposition of the assets should be made. The assets may be retained even though they include an
asset in which the trustee is personally interested;
(b) receive additions to the assets of the trust;
(c) continue or participate in the operation of any business or other enterprise and effect
incorporation, dissolution, or other change in the form of the organization of the business or
enterprise;
(d) acquire an undivided interest in a trust asset in which the trustee, in any trust capacity, holds an
undivided interest;
(e) invest and reinvest trust assets in bonds, notes, stocks of corporations regardless of class, real
estate or any interest in real estate, interests in trusts or in any other property, or individual interests
in property wherever it is located;
(f) invest and reinvest trust assets in securities of an open-end or closed-end type management
investment company or investment trust which is registered under the Investment Company Act of
1940, as amended, including securities of any investment company or investment trust that is
affiliated with or a subsidiary of the trustee, or to which the trustee or its affiliate or subsidiary
provides a service such as that of an investment advisor, custodian, transfer agent, registrar, sponsor,
distributor, manager, or otherwise, for which it receives reasonable remuneration for such service;
(g) deposit or invest trust funds in a bank, including a bank operated by the trustee;
(h) (i) acquire or dispose of an asset, for cash or on credit, at public or private sale;
(ii) manage, develop, improve, exchange, partition, change the character of, or abandon a trust
asset or any interest therein; and
(iii) encumber, mortgage, or pledge a trust asset for a term within or extending beyond the term of
the trust, in connection with the exercise of any power vested in the trustee;
(i) make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or alterations in buildings or other structures, or
demolish any improvements, raze existing or erect new party walls or buildings;
(j) (i) subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to public use;
(ii) make or obtain the vacation of plats and adjust boundaries;
(iii) adjust differences in valuation on exchange or partition by giving or receiving consideration;
or
(iv) dedicate easements to public use without consideration;
(k) enter, for any purpose into a lease as lessor or lessee with or without an option to purchase or
renew for a term within or extending beyond the term of the trust;
(1) enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration and removal of minerals or other natural
resources or enter into a pooling or unitization agreement;
(m) grant an option involving disposition of a trust asset, or take an option for the
acquisition of any asset;
(n) vote a security, in person or by general or limited proxy;
(o) pay calls, assessments, and any other sums chargeable or accruing against or on account of
securities;
(p) sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion rights, consent, directly or through a
committee or other agent, to the reorganization, consolidation, merger, dissolution, or liquidation of a
corporation or other business enterprise;
(q) hold property in the name of a nominee or in other form without disclosure of the trust so that
title to the property may pass by delivery, but the trustee is liable for any act of the nominee in
connection with the property so held;
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(r) insure the assets of the trust against damage or loss and the trustee against liability with respect
to third persons;
(s) (i) borrow money to be repaid from trust assets or otherwise;
(ii) advance money to be repaid from trust assets or otherwise; or
(iii) advance money for the protection of the trust, and for all expenses, losses, and liabilities
sustained in the administration of the trust or because of the holding or ownership of any trust assets,
for which advances with any interest the trustee has a lien on the trust assets as against the
beneficiary;
(t) (i) pay or contest any claim;
(ii) settle a claim by or against the trust by compromise, arbitration, or otherwise; and
(iii) release, in whole or in part, any claim belonging to the trust to the extent that the claim is
uncollectible;
(u) pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the trustee, and other expenses incurred in the
collection, care, administration, and protection of the trust;
(v) allocate items of income or expense to either trust income or principal, as provided by law,
including creation of reserves out of income for depreciation, obsolescence, amortization, or for
depletion in mineral or timber properties;
(w) notwithstanding the provisions of Section 75-5-102, pay any sum distributable to a beneficiary
under legal disability, without liability to the trustee, by paying the sum to the beneficiary or by
paying the sum for the use of the beneficiary either to a legal representative appointed by the court, or
if none, to a relative;
(x) effect distribution of property and money in divided or undivided interests and adjust resulting
differences in valuation;
(y) (i) employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisers, or agents, even if they
are associated with the trustee, to advise or assist the trustee in the performance of his administrative
duties;
(ii) act without independent investigation upon their recommendations; and
(iii) instead of acting personally, employ one or more agents to perform any act of administration,
whether or not discretionary;
(z) prosecute or defend actions, claims, or proceedings for the protection of trust assets and of the
trustee in the performance of his duties; and
(aa) execute and deliver all instruments which will accomplish or facilitate the exercise of the
powers vested in the trustee.
(4) If a governing instrument or order requires or authorizes investment in United States
government obligations, a trustee may invest in those obligations, either directly or in the form of
securities or other interests, in any open-end or closed-end management type investment company or
investment trust registered under the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
Sections 80a-1 through 80a-64 if:
(a) the portfolio of the investment company or investment trust is limited to United States
government obligations, and repurchase agreements are fully collateralized by United States
government obligations; and
(b) the investment company or investment trust takes delivery of the collateral for any repurchase
agreement either directly or through an authorized custodian.
(5) The trustee may exercise the powers set forth in this section and in the trust either in the name
of the trust or in the name of the trustee as trustee, specifically including the right to take title to
encumber or convey assets, including real property, in the name of the trust. This subsection applies
to a trustee's exercise of trust powers both prior to and after the effective date of this subsection. After
the effective date of this subsection, for recording purposes, the name and address of at least one
trustee must be included on all recorded documents affecting real property to which the trust is a
party in interest.
(6) (a) If the fair market value of a trust is less than $25,000, the trustee may terminate the trust by
the following procedure:
(i) the trustee shall determine a plan of distribution that agrees, as nearly as possible, with the
trust's dispositive plan;
(ii) the trustee shall give notice to all interested persons of its intent to distribute the assets in
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accordance with the plan unless an interested person objects within 20 days after the date of the
notice;
(iii) if no objection is received within 20 days after the date of the notice, the trustee shall proceed
to distribute the trust assets in accordance with the plan;
(iv) if the trustee receives a written objection to the plan within 20 days of the date of the notice,
the trustee shall not distribute the assets of the trust, but may then petition the court for an order
authorizing distribution in accordance with the plan. The court shall have plenary authority to
approve, modify, or reject the trustee's petition.
(b) The existence of a spendthrift or similar provision shall not effect the trustee's powers under
this subsection unless the trust instrument specifically provides that the trustee shall not have the
power to terminate the trust.
Amended by Chapter 179, 1992 General Session
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merit, in my view. We tolerate nonuniformity of result in negligence cases all the
time. Nothing this Court does can bring
about uniformity of result with respect to
drugs. The states are already divided on
the issue of whether FDA approval of a
drug should confer immunity from design
defects, although it appears that no state
has gone as far as Utah now does. Suffice
to say, a number of courts apply comment
k on a case-by-case basis—a task that cannot be avoided even under the majority's
position if a strict liability claim is coupled
with a negligence claim, as is usually the
case.

crimina] homicide. Because of alienists' reports, the Washington County prosecutor
dropped all criminal charges on February 7,
1989. Mrs. Grundberg and Janice Gray,
the personal representative of Mrs. Coats'
estate, filed this civil action later in 1989.
At issue in this case is whether Halcion
was the cause of Mrs. Grundberg's bizarre
behavior on the night of the homicide.
If Halcion was a causative agent, it is
significant that The Physicians' Desk Reference (1990 ed.) lists nine other hypnotic
agents available for use. At least two of
the other hypnotics and one other medication listed as a sleeping aid are benzodiazepines and are, therefore, of the same
general type as Halcion. In addition, the
same reference lists thirteen sedatives that
are on the market. The majority ignores
the fact that the FDA found Halcion to be
neither unique nor particularly essential
and presented no advancement over existing therapeutic alternatives. Perhaps not
all would have been appropriate medications, but with so many possible alternatives, it is doubtful that Halcion should be
immune from strict liability.

Significantly, Congress has not shared
this Court's professed concern for uniformity. Whatever lack of uniformity there has
been in drug cases has been insufficient to
justify uniform national products liability
legislation. Furthermore, the Legislature
of this State thought that a presumption
was sufficient protection for manufacturers rather than outright immunity. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3) (1987). It is
indeed ironic that the policy of uniformity
weighs more heavily in this Court than in
the United States Congress or the Utah
I also join Justice HOWE's dissent.
Legislature. We can only deal with the
law in Utah, and the possibility of patchwork verdicts on a nationwide basis is simply beyond our power to affect. In short,
the majority simply deprives Utahns of a
judicial remedy for injuries sustained from
defectively designed drugs, despite the fact
A. Wayne WINEGAR and Mary
that citizens of other states may recover
Winegar, his wife, Plaintiffs
for those injuries.
and Appellees,
In this case, plaintiff Ilo Marie Grundv.
berg was taking a variety of medications
FROERER
CORP.,
a Utah corporation;
for chronic depression and anxiety. HalP.F.
Investments,
a
Utah limited partcion, the medication at issue here, had first
nership;
and
Fredrick
Froerer, III,
been prescribed for Mrs. Grundberg on
Zane
Froerer,
and
Phyllis
Froerer,
indiMay 21, 1987.* In December 1987, Mrs.
viduals,
Defendants
and
Appellants.
Grundberg lost her job and, shortly thereNo. 890160.
after, moved with her mother, Mildred
Coats, to Hurricane, Utah, where they lived
Supreme Court of Utah.
together in a mobile home. On June 19,
May 17, 1991.
1988, Mrs. Grundberg took three medications: Valium, codeine, and Halcion. Later that night, she shot and killed her mothPurchasers brought action against aser. Mrs. Grundberg was charged with signees of executory land sale contract,
4. Halcion is the trade name for triazolam, a
prescription medication used for treatment of
insomnia. Triazolam is one of a class of drugs

known as benzodiazepines. Halcion, which is
manufactured by Upjohn, was approved by the
FDA in November 1982.
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seeking to rescind contract and to receive
judgment for amount they had paid under
purchase agreement. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya,
J., granted purchasers' motion for summary judgment. Assignees appealed. The
Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1)
genuine issue of material fact, as to parties' intent in making assignment "subject
to" covenants and conditions contained in
agreement of sale, precluded summary
judgment, and (2) mere transfer of warranty deed as one component of assignment
transaction did not automatically establish
that parties intended conveyance of title to
property, and parol evidence was necessary
to determine what effect to give to that
transfer.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Judgment <s=>181(2, 3)
Summary judgment is appropriate only
when there is no genuine issue of material
fact and moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 56(c).
2. Appeal and Error <3=»863, 934(1)
In reviewing trial court's rulings, Supreme Court accepts facts and inferences
in light most favorable to losing party;
because summary judgment is granted as
matter of law, it may reconsider trial
court's legal conclusions. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 56(c).
3. Assignments <s=»31
Assignment is transfer of rights; delegation is transfer of duties.
4. Assignments <s=»18
Generally, all beneficial rights under
executory contract are assignable.
5. Assignments @=»90
Absent assumption of liability, assignment of contract does not impose on assignee the assignor's duties or liabilities
under contract.
6. Assignments <s=»137
Burden of proof is on party who asserts that there has been assumption of

assignor's liabilities to show assumption.by
"clear and unequivocal" evidence.
7. Assignments <§=>72
Assignment is interpreted according to
rules of contract construction.
8. Contracts <3=>147(1)
In interpreting contract, intentions of
parties are controlling.
9. Contracts <®=>147(2)
If contract is in writing and language
is not ambiguous, intention of parties must
be determined from words of agreement.
10. Evidence <s=>448
Court may only consider extrinsic evidence if, after careful consideration, contract language is ambiguous or uncertain.
11. Contracts e=>143(2)
Contract provision is ambiguous if it is
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.
12. Contracts <s=>176(2)
Whether ambiguity exists in contract
is question of law.
13. Judgment <s=>181(19)
Motion for summary judgment may
not be granted if legal conclusion is
reached that ambiguity in contract exists
and there is factual issue as to what parties
intended.
14. Judgment <s=>181(29)
Genuine issue of material fact, as to
intent of parties to assignment of executory land sale contract "subject to" covenants and conditions contained in agreement of sale, precluded summary judgment
for purchasers in action to rescind contract
and to receive judgment for amount paid
under purchase agreement.
15. Deeds <s=>56(2)
Conveyance is valid only upon delivery
of deed with present intent to transfer.
16. Deeds <*=>56(2)
It is possible for party to transfer warranty deed without intending to convey
property.
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17. Deeds <S=>56(2)
Evidence <3=>450(3)
Mere transfer of warranty deed as
component of assignment transaction did
not automatically establish that parties intended to convey title to property; thus,
Darties' intent was not evident on face of
iocuments and parol evidence was necessary to determine what effect to give to
xansfer of warranty deed.
David R. Olsen, Paul M. Simmons, Salt
-iake City, for Froerer Corp.
Joseph S. Knowlton, Salt Lake City, for
Vinegars.
DURHAM, Justice:
Plaintiffs Wayne and Mary Winegar
nought this action against the assignee of
n executory land sale contract of which
hey were purchasers. They sought to recind the contract and to receive a judglent for the amount they had paid under
le purchase agreement. The district
Durt granted their motion for summary
ldgment. We reverse.
In 1979, the Winegars entered into an
greement to purchase property in Dulesne County, Utah. The agreement proided that upon payment in full of the
Lirchase price, Ranch Liquidators of Utah,
ic. ("Ranch Liquidators1'), the sellers of
te property, would deliver to the Wineirs a warranty deed and a title insurance
)licy. In 1980, Ranch Liquidators asgned that contract to Froerer Corporation
the Froerers") as part of a larger transition in which the Froerers purchased
renty-three executory land sale contracts
om Ranch Liquidators in the same area.
: the time of the assignment, Ranch Liqdators also gave the Froerers a warranty
ed to the property named in the Wineirs' agreement. The Froerers did not
en record the deed, but kept it in their
fice.
The Froerers and Ranch Liquidators first
'ned an agreement in April 1980, giving
3 Froerers limited recourse against
inch Liquidators for claims by the real
iate buyers for any consideration that

was not Ranch Liquidators' responsibility
under the original land sale contracts. The
assignment agreement, executed in June
1980 between Ranch Liquidators and the
Froerers, transferred Ranch Liquidators'
"right, title, interest and equity" in the
purchase agreement between Ranch Liquidators and the Winegars. The Froerers
accepted the assignment "subject to the
covenants and conditions contained in the
[original land sale agreement]." No mention was made of whether the parties intended to assign Ranch Liquidators' obligations and liabilities under the contract.
Similarly, the agreement failed to mention
what the parties intended when Ranch Liquidators gave the Froerers the warranty
deed.
The Winegars paid all remaining payments on the purchase agreement to the
Froerers and completed paying on the contract in May 1984. When the Winegars
demanded a warranty deed for the property from the Froerers, the Froerers instructed them to request the deed from Ranch
Liquidators. Ranch Liquidators was unable to convey the property to the Winegars, however, because it had conveyed the
property to a third party by quitclaim deed
in 1982. Because the Winegars had never
recorded their interest under the purchase
agreement and the Froerers had never recorded the warranty deed, Ranch Liquidators' 1982 quitclaim conveyance was valid. In an unsuccessful effort to resolve the
dispute, the Froerers gave the Winegars
the unrecorded warranty deed the Froerers
had received from Ranch Liquidators. The
Winegars recorded this deed together with
a quitclaim deed executed by the Froerers
to them.
In August 1987, the Winegars brought
this action against the Froerers, alleging
that the Froerers (1) negligently failed to
record the warranty deed, allowing the
property to be deeded to third parties, (2)
negligently failed to make payments to the
fee owner, allowing the property to be foreclosed, (3) were unjustly enriched by the
amounts it had received under the purchase
agreement, and (4) breached the purchase
agreement by failing to provide the Wine-
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gars with a warranty deed and title insurance.
In their motion for summary judgment,
the Winegars sought to rescind the purchase agreement they had originally entered into with Ranch Liquidators l and
requested a judgment for the amount they
had paid under the purchase agreement.
In response to the Winegars' motion, the
Froerers submitted the affidavit of Fredrick Froerer, III, which stated that (1) the
assignment to the Froerers was an assignment only of the rights to receive payments
due under the purchase agreement, (2) the
Froerers never agreed to assume Ranch
Liquidators' liabilities under the purchase
agreement, and (3) the Froerers did not
intend acceptance of the assignment to constitute an assumption of Ranch Liquidators' liabilities. The Winegars did not
submit any affidavits disputing Mr. Froerer's testimony, relying instead on the documents appended to their brief.
By a minute entry dated January 31,
1989, the trial court granted the Winegars'
summary judgment motion "as prayed"
based on "the rationale submitted and argued by the plaintiff" in support of the
motion, which the court found to be "the
more reasonable under the facts and . . .
more in support of the apparent intent of
the parties."
On appeal, the Froerers argue that because they were not parties to the original
purchase agreement between Ranch Liquidators and the Winegars, they had no obligation to convey clear title to the Winegars
under that agreement unless they specifically assumed such an obligation. The
Froerers argue that the agreements between Ranch Liquidators and themselves
show no intent to assign liabilities, or at
least are ambiguous as to whether such an
assumption was intended. The Froerers
also argue that the trial court erred in
concluding, without considering the parties'
intent, that there was an unconditional delivery of the warranty deed to them, conveying title. The Froerers assert that the
trial court should have allowed parol evi1. Ranch Liquidators was not made a party to

dence as to the intent of the parties on both
issues.
The issues we must address on appeal
are (1) whether the assignment between
Ranch Liquidators and the Froerers clearly
assigned the duties as well as the benefits
of the executory contract, and (2) whether
giving the Froerers the warranty deed, as a
matter of law, conveyed title to the property.
[1,2] Summary judgment is appropriate
only when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah
R.Civ.P. 56(c); Allen v. Ortezy 802 P.2d
1307, 1309 (Utah 1990). In reviewing the
trial court's ruling, we accept the facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to
the losing party. Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, we may
reconsider the trial court's legal conclusions. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co.
v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243
(Utah 1990).
We first address whether the trial court
properly concluded, as a matter of law, that
the Froerers assumed Ranch Liquidators'
liabilities under the purchase agreement
when they accepted an assignment of the
agreement. We begin our analysis by reviewing applicable assignment principles.
[3-5] An assignment is the transfer of
rights; a delegation is the transfer of
duties. First American Commerce v.
Washington Mut. Sav., 743 P.2d 1193,
1194 (Utah 1987) (citing J. Calamari & J.
Perillo, Contracts § 18-24 (2d ed. 1977)).
Generally, all beneficial rights under an
executory
contract
are
assignable.
Wohlschlegel v. Uhlmann-Kihei, Inc., 4
Hawaii App. 123, 662 P.2d 505, 514 (1983)
(citing 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignments
§9
(1963)). Absent an assumption of liability,
however, the assignment of a contract does
not impose on the assignee the assignor's
duties or liabilities under the contract. See
Murr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 747
P.2d 1302, 1309 (Ct.App. 1987); Wohlschlegel v. Uhlmann-Kihei, Inc., 662 P.2d at
514; see also Higgenbotham v. Topel, 9
this litigation.
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Wash.App. 254, 511 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1973)
(requiring assignee to expressly assume assignor's obligations); Cuchine v. H.O. Bell,
Inc., 210 Mont. 312, 682 P.2d 723, 725
(1984) (assignee liable only if it is "clearly
shown that the assignee . . . expressly or
impliedly assumed the assignor's liability").
[6] In Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314,
313 P.2d 465, 466-67 (1957), we stated that
whether an assignment of the entire contract includes an assumption of liabilities
depends on the terms of the assignment
and the parties' intent. We noted that
whenever uncertainty or ambiguity exists
with respect to the assumption, "it is proper for the court to consider all of the facts
and circumstances, including the words and
actions of the parties forming the background of the transaction." Id. The burden of proof is on the party who asserts
that there has been an assumption of the
assignor's liabilities to show assumption by
"clear and unequivocal" evidence. Murr,
741 P.2d at 1309 (citations omitted).

ment. The only parol evidence offered
came from the Froerers and wholly supported their position. We must therefore
assume that the trial court found the contract unambiguous and must have thus disregarded the Froerers' evidence. We may
uphold the trial court's ruling only if we
agree that the contract was unambiguous.
As this court observed in Big Butte Ranch,
Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah
1977), we first examine the language of the
instrument, according to it the weight and
effect it shows the parties intended. If the
meaning is ambiguous or uncertain, parol
evidence of the parties' intentions should
be admitted. A motion for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists
and there is a factual issue as to what the
parties intended. Faulkner, 665 P.2d at
1293.
[14] As mentioned above, two documents made up the assignment agreement
between Ranch Liquidators and the Winegars. The first document limited the
Froerers' recourse against Ranch Liquidators. That agreement provided:

[7-12] An assignment is interpreted according to the rules of contract construction. See Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431, 433
(Wyo.1987). In interpreting a contract, the
[Ranch Liquidators] hereby grants unto
intentions of the parties are controlling.
[the Froerers] recourse against [Ranch
John Call Eng'g, Inc. v. Manti City Corp.,
Liquidators] in the event and limited
743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987). If the
only to the claims, if any, of the buyers
contract is in writing and the language is
or their assigns or successors, on said
not ambiguous, the intention of the parties
contracts for consideration of any kind
must be determined from the words of the
not made a responsibility of [Ranch Liqagreement. See Atlas Corp. v. Clovis
uidators] by the contracts simultaneously
Natl Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987);
conveyed to [the Froerers] and referred
Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386
to above.
(Utah 1977). A court may only consider
extrinsic evidence if, after careful considerUnder the original agreements between
ation, the contract language is ambiguous Ranch Liquidators and each of the purchasor uncertain. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, ers of real estate, Ranch Liquidators was
665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). A con- responsible for conveying title by warranty
tract provision is ambiguous if it is capable deed upon payment of the contract. Thus,
of more than one reasonable interpretation the foregoing language (limiting the Froerbecause of "uncertain meanings of terms, ers' recourse against Ranch Liquidators to
missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." actions it was not responsible for under the
Id.; see also Mann v. Wetter, 100 Or.App. contracts) implies that the Froerers did
184, 785 P.2d 1064, 1067 (1990). Whether assume liability for any suit by a purchaser
ambiguity exists in a contract is a question for breach of an obligation that Ranch Liqof law. Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293.
uidators was originally responsible for,
[13] In this case, the trial court granted such as conveying good title by warranty
the Winegars' motion for summary judg- deed.
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The second agreement between Ranch
Liquidators and the Froerers can be construed to indicate a different intent. Because the two documents concerning the
assignment were executed "substantially
contemporaneously" and are clearly interrelated, we must construe them as a
whole and harmonize their meanings if possible. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank,
737 P.2d at 229 The second agreement,
entitled "Assignment of Contract and Escrow/' provided:
This agreement for sale of real estate
[between Ranch Liquidators and the
Winegars] is being held by Ranch Liquidators of Utah, Inc. [The Froerers] accept this Assignment subject to the covenants and conditions contained in said
agreement of sale. Further, a warranty
deed covering the property described is
executed and delivered herewith in favor
of [the Froerers].
(Emphasis added.)
The parties differ in their explanations of
the effect of the "subject to" language
contained in the assignment between
Ranch Liquidators and the Froerers. Of
course, the fact that the parties differ as to
the interpretation of an agreement does not
alone establish that ambiguity exists.
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.y 752
P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). The Winegars
argue that this language indicates that the
Froerers assumed Ranch Liquidators' obligations under the land sale contract. This
interpretation would be consistent with the
April agreement limiting the Froerers' recourse as against Ranch Liquidators.

(1975). Just as the transferee of assets
"subject to" an indebtedness or mortgage
does not thereby assume liability for the
debt, id., "subject to" can be interpreted as
words of qualification and notice rather
than as words of assumption or contract.
See S.L. Nusbaum & Co. v. Atlantic Va.
Realty Corp., 206 Va. 673, 146 S.E.2d 205,
209 (1966).
The Idaho Court of Appeals in 1987 addressed a similar case in which the assignee of a note was sued by the obligor, a real
estate purchaser, when the obligor discovered it had actually received less property
than the assignor had represented. Murr
v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 747 P.2d
1302 (Ct.App.1987). The court noted that
the parties did not express any intent for
the assignee to assume liability for the
obligor's claims against the assignor. Id.
747 P.2d at 1310. Regarding the effect of
the words "subject to," the court held:
[T]he obligor on the note may assert
setoffs against it or may have defenses
that make the note uncollectible, but the
obligor cannot make affirmative claims
for damages against the note assignee
based upon some tort or breach of contract by the original payee.
Id. 747 P.2d at 1309 (emphasis added).

According to the Froerers, however, the
"subject to" language indicates that the
parties intended Ranch Liquidators to remain ultimately responsible to the Winegars for their obligations under the land
sale contract.2 The Froerers cite case law
from other jurisdictions regarding the effect of the "subject to" language contained
in the assignment agreement. One court,
for example, concluded, "The words 'subject to' are not promissory." Klundt v.
Carothers, 96 Idaho 782, 537 P.2d 62, 65

Similarly, the assignment from Ranch
Liquidators to the Froerers did not unambiguously make the Froerers liable for any
claim the Winegars may have had against
Ranch Liquidators under the purchase
agreement. The agreement indicated that
Ranch Liquidators would continue to hold
the purchase agreement, and we agree
with those jurisdictions that recognize, in
certain cases, that accepting an assignment
"subject to" an existing debt or obligation
may limit, rather than expand, an assignee's liability. If we acknowledge the plausibility of this interpretation, the agreement is deficient in conveying what the
parties actually intended to assign. Such a
deficiency renders the agreement ambiguous and makes parol evidence of the parties' intent essential.

2. The Froerers also cite the language "[the purchase agreement] is being held by Ranch Liqui-

dators of Utah, Inc.," as supporting this interpretation.
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Finally, we address the effect of Ranch
Liquidators' act of giving the Froerers the
warranty deed. The Winegars argue that
the Froerers purchased the property from
Ranch Liquidators with notice of the Winegars' equitable interest and so were required to convey the property when the
Winegars fully complied with the purchase
agreement. The trial court agreed. Without considering evidence of the parties' intent, the trial court concluded that there
was an unconditional delivery of the warranty deed to the Froerers. The court determined that this "delivery" transferred
fee title to the Froerers, as opposed to
constituting conditional delivery as security
for the Froerers' right to receive future
payments under the purchase agreement.
As a result, the trial court held that the
Froerers had an obligation to convey a
valid warranty deed to the Winegars and
were liable because they were unable to
perform that obligation. Id.
The Froerers concede that if the parties
intended the deed to be a present conveyance of fee title, the Froerers may have
had an obligation to convey title under an
equitable trust theory.3 They argue, however, that the property was never "conveyed" to them by Ranch Liquidators but,
rather, that they held the warranty deed
only as security in case of default.4 They
assert that just as when determining the
effect of an assignment, the issue of what
effect to give the transfer of a warranty
deed rests on the intent of the parties in
making the transfer. We agree.
[15,16] A conveyance is valid only upon
delivery of a deed with present intent to
transfer. Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632,
635 (Utah 1984). It is possible for a party
to transfer a warranty deed without intending to convey the property. Debtors, for
example, frequently execute absolute deeds
of conveyance to creditors with merely an
oral understanding that the creditor will
hold the deed only as security and reconvey

it to the debtor once the obligation is satisfied. S. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law 44 (2d ed. 1985). These
transactions often occur to avoid the strict
requirements of the law of mortgages. Id.
The case law in this country "overwhelm
ingly establishes" that parol evidence is
admissible in equity to show that a deed
although absolute on its face, was intendec
as a mortgage. Id. at 46. This rule ap
plies even though it was knowingly cast ir
the form of an absolute conveyance, and its
execution was not effected by fraud, mis
take, ignorance, duress, or undue influence
Id.
In Utah, "[a] fee simple is presumed tc
be intended to pass by a conveyance of rea
estate, unless it appears from the convey
ance that a lesser estate was intended.'
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-3. This court ha?
recognized that a deed, absolute in anj
form, may be construed as a mortgage if i<
was only intended as security under a paro
agreement rather than as an outright con
veyance. Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292
297 (Utah 1984); see also Kjar v. Brimley
27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23, 25-26 (1972
(mortgage may consist of warranty dee<
and separate written contract). The part;
claiming that a warranty deed was a mort
gage must show by clear and convincinj
evidence that the conveyance was actuall;
intended as a mortgage. Bown, 678 P.2<
at 297. In Bown, we reiterated the ek
ments a court must consider when detei
mining whether an absolute deed was ir
tended as a mortgage, including (1) whetl
er there was a continuing obligation on th
part of the grantor to pay a debt or mee
an obligation the deed allegedly was mad
to secure, (2) the question of relative va
ues, (3) contemporaneous and subsequer
acts of the parties, (4) the parties' stat(
ments, (5) the form of the written evidenc
of the transactions, (6) the nature of th
testimony on which the parties rely, (7) th
relationship between the parties, and (<

3. See, e.g., DeCorso v. Thomas, 89 Utah 160, 173,4. Of course, both the Froerers and the Winega
50 P.2d 951, 956-57 (1935) (purchaser of real
could have protected themselves by recordir
estate with notice of existing equitable interest
notice of their respective interests.
in property acquires only what vendor can
transfer and is liable in equity to same extent as
vendor).
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the apparent aims and purposes of the
transfer. Id. at 297 (citing Hansen v. Kohfor, 550 P.2d 186, 188-89 (Utah 1976)).

fore reverse and remand this case for trial
on the issue of intent,

[17] We recognize that this case is peculiar because the "grantor" of the deed
was the assignor of the contract rather
than the party who had a continuing financial obligation to the "grantee." We think
these cases are applicable, however, to illustrate that the mere transfer of a warranty deed does not automatically establish
that the parties intend a conveyance. The
transfer of this warranty deed was merely
one component of the assignment transaction. The only written evidence of the
transaction consists of the two documents
making up the assignment agreement. In
light of the ambiguity contained in the
agreement, we hold that the intent of the
parties was not evident on the face of these
documents, making parol evidence necessary to determine what effect to give the
transfer of the warranty deed.

HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J.,
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.

CONCLUSION
The agreement limiting the Froerers' recourse against Ranch Liquidators can be
interpreted as assigning to the Froerers
Ranch Liquidators' obligation to convey title to the Winegars. The transfer of the
warranty deed could indicate that the parties intended to make the Froerers liable
for Ranch Liquidators' obligations. Other
language in the assignment agreement,
however, concerning who "held" the sales
agreement and stating that the Froerers
were taking the assignment "subject to"
the covenants contained in the sales agreement tends to indicate a contrary intent. It
is not difficult to see how the trial court
was tempted to "weigh" these competing
interpretations to determine what effect to
give this agreement.
Unfortunately,
weighing evidence is proper only when
making findings of fact, not when determining questions of law in interpreting a
contract on a motion for summary judgment There is sufficient ambiguity regarding the intentions of the parties to this
transaction that the trial court could not
properly resolve this action in the Winegars' favor sis a matter of law. We there-
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Pedestrian struck by automobile driven
by intoxicated tavern patron brought dram
shop action against, inter alia, tavern owner. The Second District Court, Davis County, Stanton M. Taylor, J., entered judgment
on jury verdict against tavern owner, and
she appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall,
C.J., held that: (1) evidence supported finding that owner was liable; (2) Dram Shop
Act allowed cause of action against each
establishment that served patrons in their
intoxicated condition and, thus, jury could
award up to $100,000 liability against each
tavern owner, rather than total liability of
all taverns being limited to $100,000; (3)
doctrine of comparative negligence does
not apply to dram shop defendants so as to
allow them to look to fault of other defendants as protection or shield from liability;
but (4) doctrine of comparative negligence
applies in dram shop case as between intoxicated person and injured parties.
Reversed and remanded.
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Supreme Court of Utah
Donald Theodore SUNDQUIST, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v
Mary Alice SUNDQUIST, Defendant and Respondent
No 17057
Dec 23, 1981
Former wife filed request for termination of educational trust established by herself and former husband as divorcing
settlors for benefit of their children and distribution of its proceeds in equal shares to parties, and former husband
objected The Second District Court, Davis County, Thornley K Swan, J , entered judgment that trust had not been
created in first place, and former husband appealed The Supreme Court, Oaks, J , held that (1) by reference to
"income derived" and use of "should" in property settlement agreement between divorcing settlors whereby they
agreed to create educational trust for benefit of children, parties made clear that they were not creating present trust
but only imposing obligation to create trust thereafter and that subject matter of trust was not to be property then
owned but income installments to be received in future, and thus no trust was created at that time as to then-owned
property and as to future income installments, but (2) trust automatically came into existence as to each installment
of income from property owned at time of divorce as parties received each installment, (3) former wife had failed to
prove consent by all of beneficiaries to termination of trust, (4) former wife had failed to prove that there was no
unfulfilled purpose of trust which could be carried out by its continuance, and (5) trustee who has successfully
defended trust from depletion of its assets by decree of termination is entitled to have corpus of trust pay reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in such defense
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded
Howe, J , concurred in part and dissented in part and filed opinion in which Tibbs, District Judge, concurred
West Headnotes
[1] Trusts k30 5(1)
390k30 5(l)
(Formerly 390k301/2(1))
Inter vivos trust is created when settlor, with intent to create trust, transfers property to trustee in trust for, or declares
that settlor holds specific property in trust for, a named beneficiary
[2] Trusts k25(l)
390k25(l)
[2] Trusts k30 5(1)
390k30 5(l)
(Formerly 390k301/2(1))
Settlor need not sign formal trust instrument or employ any particular form of words to create inter vivos trust
[3] Trusts k21(2)
390k21(2)

[3] Trusts k25(l)
390k25(l)
To create inter vivos trust, settlor must have intent to create presently enforceable trust, trust property must be clearly
specified and set aside, and essential terms of trust must be clear enough for court to enforce equitable duties that are
sine qua non of trust relationship.
[4] Trusts k21(2)
390k21(2)
Requirement of clarity in essential terms of trust is met if beneficiaries are identified and nature of their beneficial
interests and duties of trustee are specified orally or in writing, or are clearly ascertainable from circumstances or
dictated by law of trusts.
[5] Trusts kl7(3)
390kl7(3)
To be enforceable against objections, trust in real property must be created by writing signed by settlor or his agent.
U.C.A.1953, 25-5-1.
[6] Husband and Wife k279(l)
205k279(l)
By reference to "income derived" and use of "should" in property settlement agreement between divorcing settlors
whereby they agreed to create educational trust for benefit of children, parties made clear that they were not creating
present trust but only imposing obligation to create trust thereafter and that subject matter of trust was not to be
property then owned but income installments to be received in future, and thus no trust was created at that time as to
then-owned property and as to future income installments.
[7] Husband and Wife k279(l)
205k279(l)
Where divorcing settlors had made enforceable agreement to create trust in installments of future income from thenowned properly, and since equity would treat trust as having been perfected when income was received, educational
trust for benefit of their children automatically came into existence as to each installment of income from property as
parties received each installment.
[8] Divorce k254(2)
134k254(2)
District court's continuing jurisdiction in divorce proceeding to make such subsequent changes or new orders with
respect to distribution of property as shall be reasonable and necessary does not authorize court to alter property
rights already vested in other parties, such as in children who are beneficiaries of trust created by divorcing settlors
in income already received and deposited in trust account. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
[9] Divorce k254(2)
134k254(2)
Statute conferring continuing jurisdiction upon district court in divorce proceeding to make such subsequent changes
or new orders with respect to distribution of property as shall be reasonable and necessary authorizes divorce court
to reallocate property rights between parties to divorce, such as by modifying earlier decree as to parties' interest in
then-owned property including installment payments of income on that property not yet received. U.C.A.1953, 30-35.
[10] Trusts k61(3)
390k61(3)

Former wife failed to prove consent by all beneficiaries to termination of educational trust created by herself and
former husband as divorcing settlors for benefit of their children where former husband, who owned beneficial
interest in remainder, resisted termination, and although one of parties' children consented to termination, other two
beneficiary children did not affirmatively consent to termination
[11] Trusts k61(3)
390k61(3)
It is not sufficient for purposes of rule requiring consent of all beneficiaries for termination of trust that beneficiaries
have no objection to its termination or take no position on matter, all beneficiaries must consent
[12] Trusts k61(3)
390k61(3)
Former wife had failed to prove, for purpose of trust's termination, that there was no unfulfilled purpose of
educational trust established by herself and foimer husband as divorcing settlors for benefit of their children which
could be carried out by its continuance where, at time of attempted termination, none of three children had yet
graduated from college although all had attended some college, none had yet attained age when majority of young
people who aspire to advanced or college educations have satisfied such aspirations, and two of three beneficiaries
gave evidence expressing strong aspirations for fuithcr higher education
[13] Trusts k246
390k246
Trustee has fiduciary duty and concomitant power to defend tnist from depletion of its assets by decrees of
termination or invalidity U C A 1953, 22-3- 14(3)(a), 75-7-402(1), (3)(t, x, y)
[14] Trusts k268
390k268
Trustee who has successfully defended trust from depletion of its assets by decrees of termination or invalidity is
entitled to have corpus of trust pay reasonable attorney's fees incurred in that defense U C A 1953, 22-3- 14(3)(a),
75-7-402(1), (3)(t,x,y)
*183 David M Swope, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant
John Lowe, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent
OAKS, Justice
The issues in this appeal are (1) whether an express trust was created, (2) if so, whether the trial court correctly
decreed termination of the trust on the ground that its purposes had been fulfilled, and (3) whether attorney's fees
incurred by the trustee can be paid from the trust corpus
I CREATION OF TRUST
H][2][3] The principles governing the creation of a trust are well settled An inter vivos trust is created when a
settlor, with intent to create a trust, transfers property to a trustee in trust for, or declares that he or she (the settlor)
holds specific property in trust for, a named beneficiary Restatement of Trusts 2d, ss 2, 17 The settlor need not sign
a formal trust instrument or employ any particular form of words Capps v Capps, 110 Utah 468, 175 P 2d 470
(1946), Acott v Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P 2d 720 (1959), Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, s 45 (2d ed 1965),
Restatement of Trusts 2d, s 24 But the settlor must have * 184 an intent to create a presently enforceable trust,
Pagano v Walker, Utah, 539 P 2d 452, 455 (1975), the trust property must be clearly specified and set aside,
Renshaw v Tracy Loan & Trust Co , 87 Utah 359, 363, 35 P 2d 298 (1934), and the essential terms of the trust must
be clear enough for the court to enforce the equitable duties that are the sine qua non of a trust relationship
Restatement of Trusts 2d, ss 2, 4, Pagano v Walker, 539 P 2d at 454, Duchesne County v State Tax Commission,
104 Utah 365, 371, 140 P 2d 335, 338 (1943)

[4] [5] This requirement of clarity is met if the beneficiaries are identified and the nature of their beneficial interests
and the duties of the trustee are specified orally, Capps v Capps, 110 Utah at 474-75, 175 P 2d 470, or in writing (as
is more common), or are clearly ascertainable from the circumstances, Restatement of Trusts 2d, ss 112, 129, or
dictated by the law of trusts Loco Credit Union v Reed, 85 N M 729, 516 P 2d 1112 (1973) To be enforceable
against objections, a trust in real property must be created by a writing signed by the settlor or his agent U C A ,
1953, s 25-5-1 But trusts other than those involving real property can be created without the formality of a writing,
Restatement of Trusts 2d, s 39, so long as they are proven by clear and convincing evidence Capps v Capps, 110
Utah at 474-75, 175 P 2d 470
The district court found as a fact that "the parties attempted to set up a trust (pursuant to the requirement in their
divorce decree) but none was created " The findings state "There is no document in evidence creating a trust," the
terms of any trust were too "ambiguous," "the time and duration of any trust which might have been created is
uncertain and a reasonable time for duration of the trust has elapsed," and "(t)he parties have not defined the terms
and conditions of any trust and the court has no basis upon which to find what the terms of any trust might be which
the parties intended to create " These findings, which are a mixture of findings of fact and a conclusion of law on the
ultimate question of the creation of the trust, are challenged by appellant We must therefore review the evidence to
see if it clearlv preponderates against the findings of the trial court Jensen v Brown, 639 P 2d 138 (1981),
Cnmmins v Simonds, 636 P 2d 478 (1981) The evidence is essentially uncontested
Appellant and respondent were husband and wife In his complaint for divorce, appellant suggested a property
settlement, including the creation of a trust of specified property "for the education of the children of the parties "
Respondent's answer agreed to this proposal, which was then embodied in a Property Settlement Agreement and
Stipulation signed by the parties on October 16, 1973 That document contains the following paragraph, which is
essentially identical to the proposals the parties had specified in their pleadings
That both Plaintiff and Defendant agree that income derived from the interest held by the parties in the real estate
syndicate known as the Big Bear Property in San Bernardino County, California, should be established as a family
trust known as the Sundquist Family Trust Fund with the Plaintiff and Defendant as Trustees with the restriction
and requirement that said funds be accumulated for the education of the minor children of the parties and at such
time as the children have received or terminated their advanced education, any sums remaining in said trust funds
should be equally divided between the Plaintiff and Defendant and during the administration of the trust if
additional monies are necessary for the education of the children, the parties should be ordered to equally
contribute to the trust fund
A week later, the district court entered a decree of divorce, which included and expressly approved the foregoing
provision and the other terms of the property settlement and ordered the parties to fulfill their agreements under it
The parties proceeded as ordered By January 24, 1975, $1,164 59 had been deposited *185 in a savings account in
the Continental Bank and Trust Company of Salt Lake City in the name of the "Sundquist Family Trust" This bank
account, for which an IRS number had been assigned, apparently required the signatures of both parties No formal
written trust agreement was in evidence, and presumably none was signed, but on January 25, 1975, the parties
signed a one-page document titled "Addendum to Trust Agreement," which recited that "The grantors do hereby
modify and clarify the trust agreement on the SUNDQUIST FAMILY TRUST " The modifications pertained to the
definition of "education" and the type of expenses that would be paid by the trust During the remainder of 1975, the
trust account showed deposits of interest income and a $1,154 62 income installment from the Big Bear Property,
and withdrawals of $495 for the educational expenses of one of the parties' children Similar deposits and
withdrawals were shown for the years 1976 through 1979
In 1976, because of conflict between the parties over which educational expenses were to be paid from the trust,
appellant petitioned the district court having jurisdiction of the original divorce proceeding for an order that
respondent sign blank withdrawal slips for appellant's use, or, in the alternative, that respondent be removed as a cotrustee This controversy was settled on May 21, 1976, by a stipulated order which (1) directed respondent to
remove herself as a joint signatory of the bank account, (2) established further definitions concerning the type and
amount and documentation of educational expenses that would be paid by the trust, and (3) directed appellant to give
respondent quarterly reports on disbursements made by the trust This order refers repeatedly to "the trust," "this
trust," or "the Sundquist Family Trust Fund " Despite this clarification, conflict over the amount or type of
disbursements appellant made for the children's education continued

On October 11, 1979, respondent filed in the original divorce proceeding under the heading of "order to show
cause" a request for the termination of the trust and the distribution of its proceeds in equal shares to the parties In
support, she recited the ages and current occupations of the three children of the marriage and alleged that "there is
no need for a continuation of the children's education " Appellant objected, and a hearing was held on February 8,
1980, at which respondent suggested for the first time, and the district court held, that the trust had not been created
in the first place
As to the $5,914 28 balance of the trust account on deposit in the bank on February 8, 1980, the district court's
conclusion that no trust was created was erroneous in law and contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence
Here two parties signed an enforceable agreement to create a trust for the education of their children, of which they
were to be trustees and to which they were to deposit the income derived from specified property The agreement
designated the purpose and beneficiaries of the trust to provide education for the parties' children with a remainder
interest in the parties themselves On the sufficiency of these terms, the facts in this case are practically identical to
those in Loco Credit Union v Reed, 85 N M 729, 516 P 2d 1112 (1973), which sustained the validity of an
educational trust created in a bank account by a property settlement agreement for the benefit of the children of the
divorcing settlors We agree with the New Mexico Supreme Court's declaration on this subject, id 516 P 2d at
1116
The rights and duties of the trustee not detailed in the trust instrument are sufficiently detailed in the law of
trusts
The use to be made of the trust property is clearly stated in the written instrument evidencing the creation
of the trust Minute details, as to the precise items for which funds in an educational trust must be used, are not
necessary for the trust's validity
To the same effect is Sherwin v Smith, 282 Mass 306, 185 N E 17 (1933), which held that a devise of sums to
family members "to be used only for educational purposes" created a valid trust even though the *186 will gave no
additional guidance on how the educational trust was to be administered
[6] When the parties signed their Property Settlement Agreement in 1973, they fulfilled all the requirements for the
creation of a trust (summarized earlier) except the existence of the trust property Even the property requirement
would have been fulfilled if the parties had transferred or declared a trust of the interest they owned in the Big Bear
Property But the agreement evidences no intent to do this Instead, the parties agreed "that income derived from the
interest held by the parties in the Big Bear Property should be established as a family trust " By this
reference to "income derived" and this use of "should" in the sense of duty, the parties made clear that they were not
creating a present trust but only imposing an obligation to create a trust thereafter, and that the subject matter of the
trust was not to be the property then owned but the income installments to be received in the future The installments
of income were future property in 1973 and thus could not have been the subject matter of a present creation of trust
Brainard v Commissioner, 91 F 2d 880 (7th Cir 1937), Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, s 113 (2d ed 1965), and
authorities cited therein Viewing the matter just after the October, 1973, agreement, the parties had an enforceable
agreement to create a trust, but no trust had been created Consequently, as to the Big Bear Property and as to future
income installments, we agree with the district court's conclusion that no trust was created
[7] However, as the parties received each installment of income from the Big Bear Property, the trust automatically
came into existence as to that installment This is a consequence of the fact that the parties had made an enforceable
agreement to create a trust in those installments of income, and the fact that equity would therefore treat the trust as
having been perfected when the income was received As Bogert explains "When the subject-matter came into
existence and into the hands of the intended settlor, it would at once be deemed to be held in trust, without any act of
appropriation by the intending settlor, " Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, s 113 (2d ed 1965), and authorities cited
therein The parties' deposit of these income installments in the properly labeled trust account in the bank is further
confirmation of their performance of their agreement to create a trust and of the existence and validity of the trust as
to those deposits
If our conclusion about the creation of this trust admitted of any doubt, it would surely be resolved by the parties'
signature on a formal "Addendum to Trust Agreement," by their performance of the trust by deposits and
disbursements for educational purposes over a period of five years, and by the fact that the existence of the trust was,
in effect, confirmed by periodic orders of the court that had approved the original agreement and supervised the
performance of what the court's orders repeatedly referred to as "the trust" or "the Sundquist Family Trust "

[8][9] For the ieasons set out above, a valid tiust was cieated and exists as to the $5,914 28 balance of the bank
account, but not as to the parties' interest in the Big Bear Pioperty or in the futuie installments theiefiom Undei
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, s 30-3-5, the district court in a divorce proceeding has "conlinuing jiuisdiction to make
such subsequent changes or new orders with lespect to the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and
necessary " That power does not authorize the court to alter property rights already vested in other parties, such as in
the children who are the beneficiaries of the trust in the income already received and deposited in the trust account
Cf Hills v Hills, 638 P 2d 516, (1981) But section 50-3-5 does authonze the divorce court to reallocate propeity
rights between the parties to the divorce, such as by modifying the earlier decree as to the parties' interest in the Big
Bear Property, including installment payments *187 not yet received [FN1] This matter can be pursued on remand
FN1 The record contains testimony that nine or ten future annual payments were then expected, in the total
amounl of approximately $18,000 to $20,000
II TERMINAIIONOFTRUST
In Clayton v Behle, Utah, 565 P 2d 1132 (1977), this Court approved and applied the general rule that even though
its prescribed duration has not passed, the beneficiaries can require a court of equity to decree the termination of a
trust where (1) all beneficiaries consent, (2) no beneficiary is under an incapacity, and (3) the continuance of the
trust is not necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust This rule is supported by a multitude of authorities,
including, in addition to those cited in Clayton v Behle, supra, Ambrose v First National Bank of Nevada, 87 Nev
114, 482 P 2d 828 (1971), Bogert, Tiusts & Trustees, s 1007 (2d ed 1962), 4 Scott on Trusts s 337 (3d ed 1967),
and authorities cited therein [FN2]
FN2 A corollary rule, also referred to in Clayton v Behle, supra, that all beneficiaries can terminate a trust
even though its continuance is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust when the settlor(s)
consent to its termination, Fowler v Lanpher, 193 Wash 308, 75 P 2d 132 (1938), Bogert, Trusts &
Trustees, s 1005 (2d ed 1962), 4 Scott on Trusts, s 338 (3d ed 1967), is inapplicable to this case because
appellant, one of the settlors, resisted termination
In its findings of fact, the district court stated that "one of the children of the parties desires that any trust should be
terminated and the other two have no objection to such termination " There were no findings of fact on whether the
continuance of Ihe trust was necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust, except as implied by the district
court's conclusions of law "the purpose of any possible trust has been accomplished, the children, beneficiaries,
have no objection to its termination and the trust should be terminated "
[10][11][12] At the conclusion of evidence in support of respondent's request for termination, appellant moved to
dismiss That motion should have been granted because respondent's request for termination failed of proof in two
essential respects
(1) Respondeni failed to prove consent by all of the beneficiaries Appellant, who owned a beneficial interest in
remainder, resisted the termination Moreover, although one of the parties' children consented that the trust be
terminated, the other two beneficiary-children did not affirmatively consent to the termination As Bogert states,
"(I)t is well settled that the court will not end the trust as a whole on the request of a part only of the beneficiaries "
Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, s 1007 (2d ed 1962) It is not sufficient for purposes of this rule that beneficiaries "have
no objection to its termination" or take no position on the matter All beneficiaries must consent Clayton v Behle,
supra, A B v Wilmington Trust Co , 41 Del Ch 191, 191 A 2d 98 (1963), Hills v Travelers Bank & Trust Co , 125
Conn 640, 7 A 2d 652 (1939), Closset v Burtchaell, 112 Or 585, 230 P 554 (1924)
(2) Respondent also failed to prove that there was no unfulfilled purpose of the trust which could be carried out by
its continuance Indeed, the contrary is clear from the evidence The purpose of the trust created by the parties was
to provide education for their children, with the remaining trust property to be divided equally between the parties
"at such time as the children have received or terminated their advanced education " At the time of the attempted
termination, the three children beneficiaries were ages 191/2, 221/2, and 241/2 All had attended some college, but
none had yet graduated from college, and none had yet attained the age when a majority of young people who aspire
to "advanced" or college educations have satisfied those aspirations Two of the three beneficiaries gave evidence
expressing strong aspirations for further higher education, one was then enrolled part time m a university, and the

other was in the army, but expressed his desire to continue his college *188 education part time on active duty and
later as a civilian. In view of these facts, we cannot see how it can be said that the educational purposes of this trust
have been fulfilled or that the appropriate and reasonable duration for performance of this trust for "advanced
education" has passed. Consequently, the trust could not be terminated. Clayton v. Behle, supra; Lafferty v. Sheets,
175 Kan. 741, 267 P.2d 962 (1954); Closset v. Burtchaell, supra.
For each of these two reasons, we hold that this trust could not be terminated on the evidence before the district
court in this proceeding.
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES
At the hearing, appellant sought an order directing the payment of his attorney's fees from the corpus of the trust.
Appellant's attorney represented that he had expended 15 hours in preparing to resist the proposed termination, plus
his time in the hearing in the district court. These fees were denied, and appellant challenges this on appeal.
[13][14] A trustee has the fiduciary duty and the concomitant power to defend the trust from the depiction of its
assets by decrees of termination or invalidity. U.C.A., 1953, s 75-7-402(1) and (3)(x) and (y); In re Hart's Estate, 51
Cal.2d 819, 337 P.2d 73 (1959); Van Gorden v. Lunt, 234 Iowa 832, 13 N.W.2d 341 (1944) A trustee who has
done so successfully is entitled to have the corpus of the trust pay the reasonable attorney's fees incurred in that
defense. U.C.A., 1953, s 22-3-14(3)(a), s 75-7-402(3)(t); In re Hart's Estate, supra; Van Gorden v. Lunt, supra;
Nelson v. Mercantile Trust Co., Mo., 335 S.W.2d 167, 175 (1960). As we said in Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53,
60, 404 P.2d 253 (1965), "a tmstee is entitled to reimbursement for all expenses properly incurred in discharging the
responsibilities of his trust." On remand, the court should therefore review the fees for legal services rendered to the
trust in this matter and order the payment of reasonable fees from the trust corpus.
Insofar as it holds that no trust was created in the parties' interest in the Big Bear Property, including their interest in
installments not paid as of February 8, 1980, the decree of the district court is affirmed. In all other respects, the
decree of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
No costs awarded.
HALL, C. J., and STEWART, J., concur.
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissenting):
I concur that a trust was created as payments were received and that the court can modify the divorce decree to
provide that no more payments should come into the trust.
I dissent from the balance of the holding of the majority opinion. I believe it to be error to require that the trust
continue as to the funds on hand just because all the beneficiaries did not consent to its termination, or because its
purpose was not fulfilled. Under s 30-3-5, U.C.A.1953, the district court has broad powers to change the funding of
education for minor children from one source to another, or to discontinue funding completely. (Incidentally, both
parents here offered to personally pay any expenses if their children desired further education). The formal rules of
trust law should not be applied to perpetuate the trust in view of the power of the court under s 30-3-5 to terminate it.
I also dissent from the statement in the majority opinion that the balance on hand, $5,914.28, has "vested" in the
children. This amount belongs to the parents upon termination of the trust under the terms of their stipulation and the
divorce decree entered in 1973.
TIBBS, District Judge, concurs in the opinion of HOWE, J.
END OF DOCUMENT
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wife in fee simple or to give her life estate, although trial court found dates of marriage, of execution of will, of
signing of addendum, and of death, it did not make any findings about testator's intent that would warrant conclusion
that testator intended that his wife be his only heir, taking estate free and absolute of any claim of testator's children
from previous marriage Rules Civ Proc , Rule 52(a), U C A 1953, 75-2-603
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Before GARFF, JACKSON and ORML, J!
OPINION
GARFF, Judge
Appellant, Steven Ashton, appeals the order determining the heirs of his father, Kenneth Dale Ashton, claiming that
the operative language of the will conveys only a life estate The court, in an order dated December 1, 1989,
determined that Ruth Elizabeth Ashton, the deceased's second wife, took the estate free and clear of all claims of the
children We reverse and remand
FACTS
Decedent, Kenneth Dale Ashton, and his first wife, Thclma, had four children After Thelma died, Mr Ashton
married Ruth Elizabeth Ashton on August 30, 1985 On March 12, 1986 he executed a will T he relevant portion
of the will, section v, reads as follows
I give, devise and bequeath all of my pioperty, real, personal or mixed, of whatever nature or wheiever situated,
which I may own or have the right to dispose of at the time of my death to my beloved wife, Ruth Elizabeth
Ashton She shall have the full enjoyment of the estate for as long as she desires or shall live
On January 5, 1989, Mr Ashton died and the will was admitted to probate Mrs Ashton objected to the
appointment of the children as personal repiesentatives because she was named in the will and was therefore
preferred under the Utah statute T he court then appointed Mrs Ashton as personal representative T he trial court
concluded that Mr Ashton, through his *542 will, left his entire estate to Mrs Ashton "free and absolute of any
claim of any other heir "
Steven Ashton appeals the couit's conclusion that Mrs Ashton inherited a fee simple interest rather than a life estate
AMBIGUIIT AND TESTATOR'S INTENTIONS
We focus our attention on section v of the will and what appears to be ambiguous wording The threshold question
of whether a writing is ambiguous is one of law Because the initial determination of whether a writing is
ambiguous does not require resort to extrinsic evidence, we accord the trial court's interpretation no particular
deference and we review for correctness Whitehouse v Whitehouse, 790 P 2d 57, 60 (Utah Ct App 1990), Grayson
Roper Ltd Partnership v Finhnson, 782 P 2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989)
[1][2] If the will is ambiguous, any rule of construction normally used in other writings must yield to the intention of
the testator as revealed in the instrument In re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 P 748, 749 (Utah 1924), In re
Poppleton's Estate, 34 Utah 285, 97 P 138, 140 (1908) The factual issue of the decedent's intent is one we review
with deference to the trial court's findings, if adequate, and we reverse only upon a finding of clear error In re Lstate
of Bartell, 776 P 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989), Utah R Civ P 52(a) In order to show clear error, the appellant "must
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's
findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly
erroneous ' " Id (quoting State v Walker, 743 P 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987))
[3] In construing a will, a court must look to the testator's intent as expressed in the will Utah Code Ann § 75-2603 (1978), In re Estate of Gardner, 615 P 2d 1215, 1217 (Utah 1980) The intent may be "ascertained not alone
from the provision itself, but from a scrutiny of the entire instrument of which it is a part, and in the light of the

conditions and circumstances in which the instrument came into existence." Poppleton, 97 P. at 140 (quoting Adams
v. First Baptist Church, 148 Mich. 140, 111 N.W. 757, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 509, 515 (1907); accord, Gardner, 615
P.2d at 1217. Thus, extrinsic evidence may be used to ascertain what the testator intended.
[4] Once a court determines intent, it must then "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon...." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). With some minor exceptions, failure to make findings on all material issues
constitutes reversible error. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). The findings "must show that the
Court's judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.' " Id. (quoting Smith v. Smith,
726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986)). The findings also " 'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" Acton, 737 P.2d at
999 (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)).
[5] The first sentence of the disputed passage appears to devise the entire estate to Mrs. Ashton in fee simple, while
the last sentence suggests a life estate, making the clause ambiguous on its face. While the court did make findings
in the present case, those findings pertain only to the dates of marriage, execution of the will, signing of an
addendum, and of the death. The findings make no mention of the testator's intent or the conditions and
circumstances surrounding the making of the will. Nor do the findings include subsidiary facts showing the steps
leading to the court's conclusion that the decedent intended that Mrs. Ashton be the only heir, taking the estate free
and absolute of any claim of any other heir.
Because the findings are insufficient to allow for adequate review, we remand for the trial court to make explicit,
detailed findings as to the conditions and circumstances surrounding the making of the will, *543 the nature of the
estate, [FN1] and finally the decedent's intent, and how that intent supports the court's conclusion.
FN1. A life estate, while sensible in the context of real estate, would be quite anomalous in the context of,
say, cash. Other pertinent facts include that the testator called his attorney to specifically add the second
sentence to the key provision after he reviewed it in draft; that no provision is made, in a will otherwise
quite detailed and complex, for distribution of any life estate remainder interest; and that the decedent
made ample provision for his wife through nontestamentary means such as insurance and joint tenancy.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur.
END OF DOCUMENT
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9 Exchange Place
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
RICHARD D. SNOW, DECEASED, AND
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY
TRUST,

ORDER OF FINAL JUDGMENT
Probate No. 993900093 EF
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

This matter came before the Court and the Court granted a Partial Summary Judgment in
favor of Petitioner on July 31,2000. Based upon the Order of the Court, and in the interest of finally
resolving this matter, the parties have submitted a Joint Stipulation for Order of Final Judgment in
this case. The Court, having reviewed the Joint Stipulation, pleadings, and record on file, and
therefore being fully advised, now orders and adjudges as follows:
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT:
1.

Judgment is awarded against Ruby Womack and she is hereby ordered to re-pay the

Richard D. Snow Family Trust in the amount of $18,687.35, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal

rate from the date any such funds were utilized until the judgment is entered, in foil repayment of
any use by her of Trust principal for moving of the Mobile Home.
2.

Judgment is awarded against Ruby Womack and she is hereby ordered to re-pay the

Trust in the amount of $11,557.11, for attorney's fees paid to her attorneys in this action from
principal of the Trust, plus pre-judgment interest from the dates paid until the judgment is entered.
3.

Ruby Womack is removed as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard D.

Snow and removed as Trustee of the Richard D. Snow Family Trust for the inappropriate use and
distribution of estate and trust assets.
4.

Marcia L. Snow, who is the named Successor Trustee to the Richard D. Snow Family

Trust and Personal Representative to the Estate of Richard D. Snow, is appointed as the Special
Administrator of the Estate of Richard D. Snow and as Trustee of the Richard D. Snow Family Trust.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Ruby Womack has expressed her intent to appeal the decision of the
Court. Therefore, the Court orders that this removal be suspended and not put into effect pending
the filing of the appeal. However, the removal of Ruby Womack shall be immediately effective
upon the expiration of 30 days from the entry of the Court's Order, if an appeal has not been filed
within that 30-day period; or, if Ruby Womack files an appeal in this matter within the prescribed
30-day period, the removal of Ruby Womack shall be effective upon the appropriate court of appeals
rendering a final decision either upholding the Court's Summary Judgment or the final Order, in
favor of Petitioner.
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5.

Upon qualification and acceptance, the Court shall issue letters of special

administration in favor of Petitioner.
6.

Ruby Womack is ordered that from the date of the joint stipulation between the

parties, she shall not remove, distribute, or expend any principal or income of the Estate of Richard
D. Snow or of the Richard D. Snow Family Trust and shall continue to hold any fluids in the Granite
Credit Union Account Number 59669-4, and shall provide monthly, within 10 days of receipt, copies
of all statements to Petitioner or her counsel.
7.

Ruby Womack is not to receive any distributions of incomefromthe Trust until she

has repaid in full all amounts ordered to be repaid to the Trust herein.
8.

Any action on Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Respondent's Counterclaims,

Petitioner's claims for attorney's fees, and the counterclaims of the Respondent, shall be postponed
until the expiration of the time for appealfromthe entry of thefinaljudgment of the Court, or until
the appropriate court of appeals renders afinaldecision on Respondent's appeal.
DATED this ^Zday of August, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

District Court Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
RICHARD D. SNOW, DECEASED, AND
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY
TRUST,

ORDER
Probate No. 993900093 EF
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment having come before the Court on the 31st
day of July, 2000, at the hour of 11:00 a.m., Dennis M. Astill appearing for Petitioner, and Robyn
R. Walton appearing for Respondent, and the Court having considered the briefs and the arguments
of the parties, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being fully
apprised in this matter, hereby enters its Order.
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Partial Summary Judgment is granted in favor
of Petitioner and against Respondent as follows:

1.

Ruby Womack is hereby ordered to change the title of the 1994 Guredon Mobile

Home, VIN #6BD01D01947680A/8 (the "Mobile Home") into the name of the Richard D. Snow
Trust, dated November 8,1993.
2.

Judgment is hereby entered against Ruby Womack and in favor of the Richard D.

Snow Trust, in the amount of $7,034.67, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal ratefromthe date
such amount was utilized by said Ruby Womack to the date payment is rendered by Ruby Womack
to the Trust.
3.

Ruby Womack is hereby ordered to re-pay the Trust the amount of approximately

$17,000, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal ratefromthe date any such funds were utilized, in
full repayment of any use by her of Trust principal for moving of the Mobile Home. Ruby Womack
is hereby ordered to provide an exact accounting to the Court of the amounts so used.
4.

Ruby Womack is hereby ordered to re-pay an amount in excess of $10,000 for

attorneys fees paid to her attorneys in this action from principal of the Trust, plus pre-judgment
interest from the dates paid until fully re-paid to the Trust.
5.

Ruby Womack is hereby ordered to render a full and complete accounting to the

Court and Marcia Snow of all funds received from the estate and Trust of Richard D. Snow,
including all principal, income and use of all funds, including but not limited to, moving expenses
for the Mobile Home, payments of attorneys fees and costs, and other uses of Trust principal or
income in accordance with this Order.

2

6.

All other issues set forth in Petitioner's Petition shall remain for trial set in this matter

for August 22,2000.

Z<

DATED this j^Jday of August, 2000.

BY THEXOURT

District Court Judge
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; JULY 31, 2000

2

HONORABLE JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT: The matter before the Court is the matter

5

of the Estate of Richard Snow, 993900093.

6

appearances, please?

7
8

MR. ASTILL:

Dennis Astill appearing for the

Petitioner Marsha (Inaudible) Snow.

9

THE COURT:

10
11

May I have

Thank you, Mr. Astill.

MS. WALTON:

Robyn Walton appearing for the

Respondent, Ruby Womack.

12

THE COURT:

Thank you, Ms. Walton.

13

This is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion for

14

Partial Summary Judgment.

15

rulings on this matter.

16

case.

17

for the courtesy copies.

The Court had previously made some
I'm acquainted with the facts of this

I've had opportunity to review the pleas.

Thank you all

I've reviewed those.

18

This is your motion, Mr. Askill, you may proceed,

19

MR. ASTILL:

20

Your Honor, as is clear from the record, we're here

Thank you, Your Honor.

21

today primarily to construe the provisions of this Trust and

22

it's a rather confusing document from the get go.

23

review the Trust there are very specific dispositive provisions

24

in Article III of the Trust providing what should happen to the

25

Trust assets at the death of Mr. Snow.

As you

Those provisions

1

clearly provide that it goes to his children or issue.

2

Page 8 of the Trust there are, I guess I can only interpret it

3

as a little bit of a strange provision where it suddenly shows

4

up with different type and different presentation from the rest

5

of the document, at a heading called Special Provisions and it

6

purports to redefine what should happen with assets of the

7

Trust.

8
9

Then at

Now, Your Honor, as we've conducted legal research tc
decide which of those two provisions rule, the rule of law

10

appears, I think generally accepted, that the later provisions

11

of the document govern, to the extent they're not inconsistent

12

with the

13

directly inconsistent, then they would overrule the prior

14

provisions in the document, but they're to be read in

15

conjunction and consistent with one another to the extent you

16

can.

17

appear to govern.

18

amends the Special Provisions and, Your Honor, the same rule o

19

law should apply.

20

- or to the extent they're consistent and if they're

And so, as we review the document, the Special Provision
And then we have an amendment that says it

Now, as we've conducted discovery with the parties,

21

from the witnesses originally identified, we find, Your Honor,

22

there are not factual disputes relating to the creation of the

23

Trust or the language of the Trust, thus it really leaves it t

24

this Court to determine the proper construction of the languag

25

of that Trust.

There is no one that has been identified, even

in the responsive memorandum from Mrs. Walton that would
indicate that anyone had ever reviewed the Trust with the
Decedent where he expressed his clear intent with respect to
any provision of the document and, in fact, the affidavits that
are provided from two individuals relate to conversations long
after the Trust was executed and long after the trust amendment
was executed, so we don't think they're relevant at all to this
Court's construction of the document itself.

So, we're here

today to get that construction resolved.
And then we're here for a couple of other matters,
Your Honor, there have been some actions that are again, are
undisputed.

Actions taken by the Trustee and beneficiary of

the Trust, Mrs. Womack, that we think is inappropriate under
the terms of the Trust and need to be resolved.

Those are that

there was a debt that was paid on a van that should not have
been paid.

The Doctrine of Exoneration should apply to that.

The mobile home was moved and principle of the Trust was
exhausted for the purpose of moving that mobile home and then
there has been expense monies and including expense monies for
attorney's fees paid to defend Mrs. Womack's interest in this
case.
Now, let me address the first point with res-pfect to
the construction of the Trust.

From the -

Oh, did you have a question?
THE COURT:

No.

3

MR. ASTILL:

From the terms of the Trust itself, Your

Honor, it is very clear in Paragraph 1 of the Special
Provisions relating to the Guerdon mobile home that Marsha
Snow, or Marsha Elingson there and now Snow was the remainder
beneficiary.

And as we look at Article III-B in Pages 3 and 4

of the Trust, Marsha Snow would have been the residuary
beneficiary under that article as well.

And so we look at the

Special Provisions and it clearly says she's the remainder
beneficiary of that mobile home and that Mrs. Womack receives
the right to reside in it as long as she desires or until she
dies or remarries.

So it's clearly, at best, a life estate anc

then the remainder or the mobile home would pass then to Mrs.
Snow at the time that that right of Mrs. Womack expires.
Now, the amendment excluded the remainder language
and so the question that this Court has to answer, does that
mean that the amendment eliminated that remainder language, anc
again the case law, Your Honor, it is pretty clear, that unless
the amendment is specifically inconsistent with the prior
provisions, then it has to be read to be consistent with those
prior provisions.

That's the rules of construction for wills

and the rules of construction for Trusts and so as we read thai
section, Your Honor, it doesn't expressly say, the remainder
interest to Marsha Snow is terminated.

It simply restates the

first sentence and so again, Your Honor, I think that the only
way to properly read that is to say that if it doesn't

expressly contradict it, if it doesn't refute it, then it has
to be read consistent with and along with the prior provisions
so that Marsha Snow would continue to be the remainder
beneficiary of that third mobile home.

Even if the Court could

read it to say, well, since they left that out, it means she
doesn't get it, she's still the residuary beneficiary under
Article III-B of the Trust and that has never been contradicted
or terminated or revised or amended other than to provide these
life interests to Mrs. Womack.
Now, the language of the Trust, Your Honor, clearly
provides a life estate only to Mrs. Womack.

As we review both

the amendment and the original Special Provisions in Paragraph
1 it says, "Ruby Womack may live in the mobile home, Guerdon,
as long as she desires or until she remarries or she dies."
And again, there's a pretty clear expression of a life estate
at best.

In fact, there's some other part of that, things that

would lead you to believe that there are other conditions for
termination other than death and that is if she doesn't want to
live there any more or she remarries, then that interest
terminates.
Now, Paragraph 3 then goes on to say, "the remainder
of the Trust Estate should be held in Trust to provide Ruby
Womack with income."

The only reasonable interpretation of

that can be, whatever is left after making these initial
disbursements, is to be there to provide her with income and we

think that's pretty consistent with the language of the Trust
in general and consistent with the prior provisions of the
Trust, Article 3 and the prior Special Provisions.

None of

those provisions expressly disinherit Mrs.. Snow and, in fact,
where Mr. Snow wanted to expressly disinherit one of his
children, he certainly did so with Patricia Sprouse, his other
daughter and he says M she gets nothing from the Trust Estate".
She's already received some stuff.
with respect to Marsha Snow.

Nowhere do we read that

And so, Your Honor, it seems

clear that the only reasonable and appropriate was to construe
the Trust is to say Mrs. Womack gets a life estate at best in
the mobile home.
Trust.

Mrs. Womack gets the income for life from the

The remainder interest goes on to Mrs. Snow.
THE COURT:

Going with that analysis, going to the

next points about the $17,000 for the mobile home and then the
selling of the van.

Is the selling of the van generating

income?
MR. ASTILL:

Well, the van wasn't sold, Your Honor.

Money was taken out of the Trust Estate.

There was a

substantial cash fund left in the Trust Estate at death.

Money

was taken from that, $7,034, and the van was paid off with
that.
THE COURT:

Her argument is, that was income, was it

not and she was entitled to it or - I'll make that argument for
her?

€

MR. ASTILL:

No, the answer is that wasn't income,

that was principle of the Trust.
THE COURT:

And you're relying upon income as defined

in the code?
MR. ASTILL:
THE COURT:

Correct.
Now, how much income was the Trust

generating?
MR. ASTILL:

Very little.

By the time the van was

sold, Your Honor, which happened immediately after his death,
there was very little income that had been generated to that
point in time and then since then, it remained in a credit
union.

We've only received one piece of information during

deposition testimony of Mrs. Womack to the effect that there
was $300 of income earned in the one year, but that's because
the principle's been exhausted.
THE COURT:
MR. ASTILL:

Sure.
And Mrs. Womack hasn't done anything but

leave it in a credit union.

So she's generating some interest

income and that's about all it was.
Now, a couple of other points, Your Honor.

With

respect to the Special Provision language and the amendment
language, where Mr. Snow intended very specific things to be
amended or revoked, or I should say just revoked, he was very
clear about that.

For example, in the amendment, where he

refers to the catastrophic illness provision, he clearly

7

understood how to revoke prior languageB of his Trust and he
says "it's hereby revoked in whole and shall no longer
control."

And so it seems, again, pre tty clear where he wanted

to cut Pat ricia Sprouse out of the document, he did.

Where he

wanted to revoke a prior provision in the Special Provisions of
the Trust, he did, and he very clearly did.

Where he hasn't

expressly done those things, Ht only - again consistent with
the case 1 aw, it can only make sense w hen it r s read in
conjunction with the other provisions, the p-trior provisions of
the Trust.

So we think Your Honor, at this point, there's

really only one conclusion that Mrs. Womack received a life
estate in the Guerdon mobile home.

The Trust still owns the

mobile home and she gets a life estate only.

The mobile home

should be placed so that it's titled in the name of the Trust
and express acknowledgment to that effect, and actually Mrs.
Womack has agreed it is an asset of the Trust.

And we think,

Your Honor, for safety sake, it needs to be titled in the name
of the Trust and this Court needs to construe the Trust so that
it's clear that Marsha Snow is a residuary beneficiary with
respect to the mobile home first, and with respect to all othei
Trust assets second.
THE COURT:
MR. ASTILL:

Okay.
Now, with respect to the arguments on

the income issue, Your Honor.

Principle and Income Act is

pretty clear in this and there's nothing that's been argued or

1

set forth before this Court including in the terms of the

2

Trust, that would change how the Principle and Income Act

3

should be applied.

4

she gets the income, then that's what it is.

5

somehow, torturously, construe the Trust to say that I can use

6

principle because I have the power as Trustee to say what is

7

income and what is principle.

8

supported by any case law;

9

the Trust certainly and the language of the Trust in fact,

Income is income and where the fTrust says
We cannot,

That's ludicrous and it's not

not supported by the language of

10

makes it very clear that, in fact I want to refer the Court

11

specifically to this, I believe it's Article VIII, Paragraph 5,

12

which was referred to several times in Mrs. Walton's

13

memorandum.

14

extent receipts should be deemed income or principle," - that's

15

on Page 11 of the Trust, Your Honor - "whether or to what

16

extent expenditures should be charged against principle or

17

income and what other adjustments should be made between

18

principle and income, provided such adjustments do not conflict

19

with well settled rules for the determination of principle and

20

income questions."

21

say "I'm going to call that income.

22

principle.

23

going to charge this one to principle, because I can.

24

Trust says I can make those decisions."

25

settled rules for the determination of principle and income

It says there "To determine whether and to what

The Trustee just can't simply out of hand
I'm going to call that

I'm going to charge this expense to income.

I'm
The

It cannot violate well

1

questions.

2

there's very little income by Mrs. Womack's own admission,

3

there's only $300 worth of income in the year that she's

4

accounted for, there's no way that those kinds of expenses can

5

be charged to income.

6

charging to principle and it's undisputed that she has used

7

that principle for her personal benefit.

8
9

And clearly, at this point, Your Honor, where

So she's just, whatever she wants, she's

Now, Your Honor, the provision of the Trust says that
she is entitled to income.

Now, a lot of emphasis is placed on

10

the second part of that language, Paragraph 3 of the Special

11

Provisions in the amendment that says "Ruby shall have complete

12

discretion in the use of the Trust Estate."

13

again, had wanted a Trust for Mrs. Womack that gave her

14

complete and unfettered discretion for her personal use of the

15

estate, he would have said it.

16

in the Catastrophic Illness Provision.

17

that.

18

not have something, he was able to do that and in Paragraph 2,

19

where he wanted somebody to have something very specific and

20

direct ownership, he was very clear.

21

be distributed to Ruby Womack.

22

expressing his intent if he wanted somebody to have something

23

absolutely.

24

and Mrs. Walton want to read it, we have to assume that that

25

language for discretionary use means she can do any darn thing

Now, if Mr. Snow

Again, he has been very clear
He knew how to revoke

Where he wanted Patricia Sprouse to have something - to

The 1995 custom van shall

He didn't have any trouble

And in order to read the Trust the way MrS. Womack

1C

1

she pleases, but he didn't really say that and it ignores the

2

prior provisions of the Trust, so it can't be read consistent

3

with that intent.

4

In 75-7402 of the Code, Your Honor, "When the

5

Trustee", the reference is made there to the broad discretion

6

give to a Trustee.

7

Paragraph 3, is consistent with Utah law.

8

Trustee can perform every act which a prudent man would perform

9

for purposes of the Trust."

That's how we read and should read that
Utah law says, "The

Very very broad discretionary

10

power.

Section III of 75-7402 give exceptionally broad powers

11

for investment and management of the Trust.

12

inconsistent.

13

with regard to the Trustee's discretion and how the Trust is

14

administered, but it doesn't eliminate Paragraph 2 or Part 2 of

15

that Section 402, it says that "The Trustee must act with due

16

regard to the obligations of a fiduciary."

17

not eliminated their responsibility and so Mrs. Womack, in her

18

efforts to administer the Trust, has administered it for her

19

personal benefit, period.

20

Honor, she is the sole beneficiary and the only person who is

21

entitled to anything out of this Trust.

22

that.

23

life estate in the mobile home.

24

She can do anything she wants with the van, but he didn't say

25

"You have the unfettered, complete right to anything you want

So that's not

Utah law is very consistent with that language

And, Mr. Snow has

In her view of this Trust, Your

He said that she gets the income.

Mr. Snow didn't say
He said she gets a

She gets the van outright.

11

1

with any assets of this Trust and there's nothing in here that

2

would restrict that."

3

That's not what he said.

And again, Your Honor, as you review the language of

4

this document consistent with all the prior provisions as

5

muddled as it becomes, I think that's the only reasonable

6

reading, is that she's an income beneficiary only of the assets

7

of the Trust other than the mobile home and the mobile home has

8

its own specific provisions for how long she can remain in that

9

mobile home.

And finally that Mrs. Snow is the residuary

10

beneficiary of the mobile home and any other assets remaining

11

in the Trust at death.

12

Let me move next, Your Honor, to the non-exoneration

13

issue.

Mrs. Womack took money out of the Trust to pay off a

14

debt that existed against the

15

her, it was specifically devised.

16

clear on that Your Honor, that any specific device passes

17

property subject to a lien or debt, period.

18

under that same section, make it clear that it's set up to

19

establish a rule of construction against exoneration of debts

20

and so Mrs. Womack took money from the Trust to exonerate a

21

debt against the estate.

22

estate debt, it clearly was, but it was a debt that was secured

23

by the van, she was the specific (inaudible) of the van.

24

609 very clearly says you don't exonerate the debt unless

25

there's language that says so and there is no language that car

y

9b van that was disposed of to
Uniform Probate Code is very

And the comments

We don't dispute that it was an

752-

12

be pointed to.

So we thinkf very clearly, Your Honor, at the

very least, Mrs. Womack owes this Trust right now, $7,034.67
plus interest because she misused funds of the Trust.
Now, Your Honor, as we continue through some of these
other issues, I think really the next big issue and it is
relating to the THE COURT:

What about the $17,000 used for the

moving of the mobile home?
MR. ASTILL:

That's what I'm coming to, Your Honor.

Mrs. Womack has, much like the exoneration of the debt issue
has taken principle from the Trust and if the Trust is read as
we construe it, Your Honor, she's not entitled to that
principle.

So she's now taken $17,000, approximately - we

don't have an exact figure - and used it to move the mobile
home to a new location.

There's no basis for that in the Trust

itself and again, it's not her personal Trust.

It was created,

she's clearly a beneficiary, we don't dispute that, but it
doesn't give her, as the Trustee and a beneficiary, the sole
right and power to spend money anyway she sees fit.

She has to

consider her fiduciary obligations to all beneficiaries
including the residuary beneficiary, Mrs. Snow.
Now, Your Honor, the attorney's fee is a similar
issue.

During the course of discovery we find that from the

Trust, Mrs. Womack has spent over $10,000 now paying attorney's
fees to defend herself for her misappropriation of Trust funds,

13

misuse of Trust funds and misconstruction of the Trust.
are clearly Your Honor, personal obligations.

Those

In our reply

memorandum we provided the Court with a case Ashton versus
Ashtonf where it's very clear and that was a probate matter of
course, but it provided there very clearly, that where a
beneficiary is defending their claims, their rights, to Trust
assets or estate assets, those are not appropriate
administrative expenses.
cannot be allowed.

Those are personal expenses and fees

And we're asking the Court to make Mrs.

Womack, then account to the estate, account to the Trust for
her personal use of Trust assets, including the payment of
these fees and refund those funds back to the Trust.
Now, let me address a couple of issues brought up in
the Reply Memorandum.

First of all, the argument was made that

the amendment supercedes the Special Provisions only and so it
was intended and meant to replace just the Special Provisions
clauses of the Trust.

Well, Your Honor, if you look at Page 8

of the original Trust, that same language that Mrs. Womack is
arguing, it says "These above Special Provisions supercede all
others in this Trust."

If that's true, then that same language

should apply and so the Special Provisions language could only
supercede Special Provisions language, which means it, doesn't
modify the terms of Article III-B of the Trust.
with that reading of the Trust, Your Honor.

We'd be happy

But I doa*t think

it's fair or reasonable and I don't think that's correct.

I'm

1

willing to admit from our own case law research that we think
the Special Provisions govern,

Nowf we've addressed the

discretionary use of funds heref Your Honor.
We think finally, let me just address one last point
and that is with respect to the affidavits that were presented
to this Court.

As you review those affidavits, first of all,

Your Honor, ultimately I will make an objection to this Court
even hearing testimony from those witnesses because they were
never identified.

We've never had a chance to do discovery.

Discovery is now cut off and suddenly we are, through this
Reply Memorandum, we are informed of a dozen witnesses we've
never heard of before, but even with that, Your Honor, if you
look at the affidavits that are Exhibits 6 and 7 to the
Opposition Memorandum, both of those relate to conversations
held with Mr. Snow at least two or three years after the date
that he executed his Trust.

So even if they could be brought

before this Court and the Court wanted to consider it, they
can't have any relevance in determining what the intent of Mr.
Snow was when he drafted the Trust, when he created the Trust
and you'll note that neither one of those affiants indicated
that they'd ever read the Trust document itself or had the
document read to them Mr. Snow.
statements to them.

So, he may have made some

I'm not even going to argue about that

because we are here on a Summary Judgement Motion, but they're
not relevant to determining his intent in 1995 when he executed

15

1

that amendment to the Special Provisions, and so we don't think

2

those apply, Your Honor, or can even be read in conjunction

3

with the construction of this document.

4

Thank you, Your Honor.

5

THE COURT:

6

Ms. Walton?

7

MS. WALTON:

Are there any questions?

I don't think so.

Thank you, Mr. Astill.

Your Honor, the first thing that I'd

8

like to address to just get out of the way is the Petitioner's

9

documents claim that the affidavits and several of the facts

10

that have been alleged in our response to their motion for

11

Summary Judgement is inadmissable and I just wanted to just

12

briefly bring in the fact that we've done away with the Dead

13

Man Statute here in the State of Utah in that Utah Rules of

14

Evidence 601 CI allows us to bring in statement of a decedent

15

if it's on personal Jaw ledger of the declarant at the time the

16

manner was recently perceived.

17

themselves address the requirements of that rule.

18

supported by Madis versus O'Leary.

19

I'd like to kind of, because we have a lot of different issues,

20

I'm going to try and squeeze it down into about four or five

21

arguments.

I believe the affidavits
That's also

That having been addressed,

22

Obviously we don't - and I'm sure it's no surprise

23

agree on how the law is reading as far as our research goes.

24

We're not here to really litigate whether or not Mr. Snow's

25

documents are pretty.

What I believe we are here to litigate

U

it is what his documents say.

In my research this very issue,

trusts are somewhat hesitantly compared to contracts and I
believe the rule is that we have to go to the actual documents
themselves to ascertain what the decedent's intent was.

We are

also allowed to look at the facts that are surrounding the
decedent's life at the time the documents were created if that
will help us to ascertain meaning, but I do believe it's
important for us to stay on task and look at the actual
documents themselves.
The first thing that we know - first of all, I just
have to kind of lodge an objection here about the continued use
of some documents that we don't believe match the originals.
With the Reply Memorandum that we submitted with the Court and
with the original Court file, we have filed the decedent's
original documents and the petitioner continues to use a set of
documents that we disagree on if they even resemble the
originals.

The document that I attached, if you wouldn't mind

Your Honor, looking fiat Page 8 of my exhibit, that's attached to
the Memorandum in Opposition.
THE COURT:
MS. WALTON:

Your Exhibit 1?
Yes.

Exhibit 1, down at the bottom

there's some handwriting and obliterations on that.

The very

bottom of the document, that page has a strange notation that
says 'void'.

Throughout the discovery we haven't been ^ble to

find who made those marks and as close as we can tell from the
17

1

discovery, we believe those marks were made by Richard Snow.

2

So our position it that obviously that this particular page was

3

meant to be done away with by the amendment.

4

Exhibit 2 and I have to strongly disagree that Mr. Snow didn't

5

deal with the remainder issue and if we look to the facts that

6

occurred at his time of life, it says in here that the

7

remainder of the Trust (inaudible) in the amendment, shall be

8

used by Ruby Womack with income and that she shall have

9

complete discretion in the use of the Trust Estate.

The amendment is

I believe

10

the word 'remainder' in and of itself presents a conflict with

11

Mr. Astill's argument in reading the Special Provisions in the

12

original Trust.

13

that section, if we can't agree on what the decedent meant,

14

then we can go look at Parole Evidence.

15

don't think that we can use Parole Evidence or even Rules of

16

Construction to imply a meaning on Mr. Snow's documents.

17

far as the other issues, we're going to come back to that very

18

thing, I think that the documents need to be read as they are

19

and given meaning as they are.

20

I believe that is our conflict and I believe

But until then, I

So as

Let me move on here to, we discussed the plain

21

language of the documents and our position, Your Honor, is that

22

we should use the four corners of the original Trust and the

23

Amendment to determine what Mr. Snow meant.

Jh

Only if there's

24

ambiguous things can we go to Rules of Construction and Parole

25

Evidence.

18

The Remainder Clause has been addressed.
^remainder' can be no more obvious than it is.

The word

It says in here

"Remainder in Trust to provide Ruby Womack with income."

Now,

we have a dispute here on the actual language and it's boiled
down to actually English or grammar.

It says here "the

remainder of the Trust is" - again Your Honor, I'm looking at
Exhibit 2 to my document, Paragraph 3 "the remainder of the
Trust Estate shall be held in Trust to provide Ruby Womack with
income."
that.

Obviously we have two different interpretations of

Ruby Womack believed she was to be provided with income.

She lived together with the decedent.
They had a romance for years.

They were life partners.

She took care of him through

thick and thin and we believe that he meant to provide her with
income and it was to be in her discretion.

Now, if there's

going to be an ambiguity in the word ^income' then we get to
look to Parole Evidence.

I don't believe that we have any

evidence that's even been submitted by Marsha Snow.

There

isnrt one affidavit or one fact that's been put into evidence
that she knows that her dad meant something different.

There's

no fact whatsoever from Marsha Snow in fact, with the motion
for Summary Judgment or the Reply.
Then, I'd like to talk Your Honor, I believe the
document also itself, should be what we look to when we talk
about the other issues.

Paying the decedent's debt.

Now, I

was kind of surprised this morning, to hear Mr. Astill admit he

19

1

had a hard time seeing this along the way is that there is no

2

dispute that the van is the debt of the estate.

3

pleadings that they've submitted to you, Your Honor, they have

4

claimed that the van debt, is Ruby's debt and the fact of the

5

matter is - if I can just take you to Exhibit 9, I have

6

enclosed and subpoenaed the documents that came from Larry H.

7

Miller where the decedent bought the van and it will clearly

8

show that it was a debt of Richard Snow's.

9

documents here, Your Honor, so that you could see by the terms

In all of the

I put those

10

of this contract that if this van debt wasn't paid off, you

11

better believe that these people are going to come in and repo

12

this van and make it be paid by the estate.

13

Then I'd like to take and compare, let's go back to

14

the Trust, Exhibit 1, and this is back on Page 11, and what I'd

15

like to read is Paragraph 7 on there.

16

in and I don't know, Your Honor, if you've read the whole Trust

17

or just the parts that we've pointed out.

18

is Powers of Trustees.

19

of Richard Snow's Trust have the power to renew, assign, alter,

20

extend, compromise, release, with or without consideration or

21

submit to arbitration or litigation, obligations or claims held

22

by or asserted against the undersigned."

23

within Ruby's discretion to pay off a contract that the

24

undersigned owed.

25

contract was with Richard Snow and it was completely within her

This section is a lead

Page 10 Article VIII

It says in Article VII, "The Trustees

So it was completely

The undersigned being Richard Snow.

The

20

discretion and our position, Your Honor, is that we have to
look at what his document said before we even go to the
Statute.

The Statute also supports our position that the

Trustees have the right to pay claims.

But we believe the

documents should take precedence in that.
The documents said that Ruby didn't have the
discretion to pay attorney's fees.

This has been made to look

at like the attorney's fees that Ruby has paid are a debt of
Ruby's.

But if we look back to the very beginning of this law

suit which by the way, was filed well before any of these fees
were incurred.

The only issue when Marsha filed this law suit

was the van issue.

The document itself also allows in paragrah

11, or page 11, paragraph 6 to delegate powers to agents
including attorneys and to remunerate them and pay their
expenses.

Again, the document that Ruby is working with has

told her she has the ability to pay those fees.

And if I'm not

mistaken, the Petition that started this whole law suit is a
petition for removal of Trustees for things that a Trustee did
wrong and I don't see how that can be contorted into Ruby's own
personal expenses.

I believe the documents should prevail in

that respect.
We believe that the document also - there's one more
thing I'd like to point out that is also kind of a grammatical
issue that opposing Counsel has, I think, misstated.

Page 11

Paragraph 5, opposing Counsel said that Ruby Womack as Trustee,

21

\*

Jxs u^

r
A

<

<?

i

doesn't have the right to dip into principle and say what's

2

income and expenses because she's bound by the Rules of

3

Principle and Income which goes to our Utah State Principle and

4

Income Rules.

5

apart that paragraph really carefully.

6

"Trustee has the right to determine whether and to what extent

7

receipts should be deemed income or principle, whether to or to

08

what extent expenditures should be charged against principle or

9

But I want to just look at the paragraph and cut
It says that Ruby as

income, and what other adjustments should be made between

10

principle and income provided the adjustments do not conflict

11

with (inaudible) Rules of Income and Principle.

12

and income question does not relate, we believe, to her extent

13

to determine what expenditures should be charged to income or

14

principle and that when she read this, she thought that she was

15

fully within her right as trustee to move the mobile home.

16

We're dealing here with a sixty-eight year old woman who is not

17

capable of working and she believed that Richard, her life

18

mate, set this Trust up to take care of her for the rest of her

19

life, and so she believed it was well within her rights.

20

in fact, in the depositions, Marsha Snow - and I put this an

21

exhibit, Your Honor, and this is exhibit, I believe number 10

22

up on Paragraph 15, this is Marsha Snow talking about the

23

decedent's comments, "He also told me that I could move the

24

home and I could do whatever I wanted to do with it.

25

there was sufficient money in the account for me to move the

The principle

And

He said

22

home if I chose to or leave it there."

So I think that from

the statements of the Petitioner herselff that there is not
question that Richard Snow meant that it would be okay for the
mobile home to be moved.

And I realize that Counsel is trying

to say that we took that out of context but what I'm saying is
that it was even in the petitioner's eyes, something that her
father, the decedent anticipated that was okay for the trustee
to do because what I believe what she was talking about was a
period of time when she was still the trustee.

However, we get

down the years several years, and Mr. Snow amends his Trust and
makes Ruby Womack the trustee; but I still don't see any reason
why the current trustee wouldn't have had the powers that
Marsha believed she had when she was the trustee.
One of the final things that I would like to do is
that I believe that the case that opposing counsel, the Ashton
case that he was talking about saying that it is inappropriate
to use attorney's fees and charge them as administrative
expenses.

I believe this case could be distinguished.

In the

Ashton case, the surviving wife had a claim against the estate.
She was a claimant against the estate, a creditor's claim.

She

wanted the attorney's fees to be paid out of the estate and the
Court of Appeals told her that she couldn't do that.
In our documents, Your Honor, I have shown a Supreme
Court case that says that if you're sued as a Trustee and the
documents says that you can, Sunquist versus Sunquist 639P says
23

1

that M the Trustee may also prosecute or defend actions, claims,

2

or proceedings for the protection of the trust assets and of

3

the trustee in the performance of his duties."

4

Your Honor that the documents should prevail, that we are under

5

responsibility to Mr. Snow to make sure that the document, what

6

he said in the document prevails.

7

We believe,

There are several issues of fact that are presented

8

as evidence in this.

First of all, we have issues of fact even

9

in the fact that the petitioner continues to say that the

10

misappropriated monies are personal debts of the decedent's and

11

I hope that we've illustrated that they are legitimately Trust

12

expenses authorized by the Trust.

13

The other thing that we've hoped to show is that

14

there's a dispute of fact in the evidence in the parole

15

evidence.

16

Trust and the Amendment, then we get to bring in evidence,

17

parole evidence, to say what Mr. Snow meant and we did that.

18

If we're going to go beyond four corners of the

Now, Mr. Astill has led you to believe that we have

19

withheld or something of our witnesses, but I'll have you know

20

that not one time during the depositions - and he's deposed my

21

client twice - did they ask us who our witnesses were going to

22

be and if we knew anybody who had discussions or knowledge of

23

Mr. Snow's estate plan.

24

them in our witness list, but under no circumstances were they

25

withheld to be dishonest in any way.

We do have those witnesses.

We put

24

1

Your Honor, we believe that our document speaks for

2

itself and that it's very important for us and this Court to

3

read and use the documents before we look to Rules of

4

Construction.

5

wills.

6

document says, but we can't legally go beyond the words of the

7

document and construct what we think Richard meant especially

8

because there are severe issues that of fact with that are

9

inappropriate for summary judgment.

We've been quoted Rules of Construction for

Those would be helpful if we didn't know what the

10

THE COURT:

11

Briefly Mr. Astill?

12

MR. ASTILL:

Thank you.

Thank you Ms. Walton?

Yes, Your Honor.

I am very much

13

confused by M s . Walton's statement that we continue to use

14

documents that do not resemble the original.

15

that we presented to the Court were documents that were

16

provided to us by Mrs. Womack and through the course of

17

depositions, I think we determined, that there were some

18

numbers that were on pages that were missing in those copies

19

but that otherwise the text was the same.

20

the Court here today that the text is exactly the same >vnd I

21

don't understand that statement but I just want to clarify

The documents

I just represent to

22 I that.

r\
:

\A )

I think it's true, Your Honor we need to understand

I how we define remainder and who it applies to and I think our
2|5 I argument stands on that.

25

THE COURT:
MR. ASTILL:
THE COURT:

Let me ask you a question, Mr. Astill.
Yes.
As to the van, if I buy your

interpretation, then Ms. Womack was entitled to that van and
your case law would indicate she's entitled to the van and she
takes all the liens and whatever is left owing on it and it's
her responsibility to pick it up.
MR. ASTILL:
THE COURT:
MR. ASTILL:

That's correct.
Her responsibility personally?
Correct.

Subject to.

So in other words

she's entitled to the equity value of that van, okay?
THE COURT:

But Ms. Walton brings up a point, whether

or not that is an indebtedness that eventually is going to be
jpicked up by the estate one way or the other.
of an inevitability argument that she's saying.

I mean it's kind
That while

Womack may have paid it at $7500, eventually it was going to be
paid by the estate anyway based upon the position that this was
an estate property.
MR. ASTILL:

Right, and I think that's the fallacy

Your Honor, in the Code Section that's referred to specifically
addresses that issue.
THE COURT:
MR. ASTILL:
Honor, so that we...

Okay.
It says, If I can find it quickly, Your
(Inaudible).

Okay, 75-2609 says, "A

specific device passes subject to any security interest

26

1

existing at the date of death without right of exoneration

2

regardless of the general directive in the will to pay debts.''

3

What we have here is a Trust with that same general directive

4

to pay the debts.

5

disposes of the asset and, yes, if Your Honor, if the equity

6

value of that asset were insufficient to satisfy the obligation

7

then I have no problem with the concept that that falls, that

8

debt, that excess debt falls back to the estate.

9

Mrs. Walton argument would really throw out the non-exoneration

10

statute and that's not the intent and the comment provides that

11

it's a statute, a Rule of Construction against exoneration and

12

it goes on in the comments to 609 "unless the will indicates to

13

the contrary, a specific (inaudible) of a mortgage property

14

takes subject to the lien without right to have other assets

15

apply to discharge the secured obligation."

16

wherever there's a secured obligation, Your Honor, not a

17

general claim, not a general debt of the estate, a specifically

18

secured obligation and somebody is specifically devised that

19

asset, they have to use that asset to pay that debt and it's

20

not exonerated by the estate itself so that they don't get it

21

free and clear.

22
23
24
25

And so the statute is saying, Your Honor, it

THE COURT:

But to adopt

So very clearly,

What would the language be that, that

would be covered by the estate (inaudible)?
MR. ASTILL:

Well, if I were doing it, Your Honor,

and I said I hereby specifically devise the 1995 Chevy van to

27

Ruby Womack, I'd say and I direct my trustee to repay any
indebtedness secured by the van.

If you understand the non-

exoneration statute, that's what you have to do.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. ASTILL:

Okay.

Your Honor, I think we can all agree

that there's no ambiguity as to what is meant by income and Ms.
Walton says Mrs. Womack gets the income.

What we don't agree

on is the argument that Mrs. Womack, because she's the trustee
and because she's given broad discretion, can call anything
income and anything principle she wants and charge anything to
income and chaige anything to principle she wants, just
because.
13 I statutes.

That's not consistent with the case law or the
Mrs. Walton also argues that we have to look at the

14

four corners of the original Trust.

15

that, that's what we're here today to do and we shouldn't apply

16

Rules of Construction.

17

construe these documents.

18

years.

19

I don't disagree with

The Rules of Construction are meant to
They've been adopted over many

Your Honor, with respect to the attorney's fees let

20

me address the Ashton case.

The Ashton case was specifically

21

about a disagreement among the heirs including Mrs. Ashton as

22

to how the will should be construed and how the assets should

23

be disposed of.

24

representative and trustee, she wanted to be paid because it

Now because she was the personal

25 I was in her mind as in Mrs. Womack's, her duty to construe the
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1

trust, but the Courts are very clear on this, Your Honor, if

2

this construction, contest, if this contest about how to

3

dispose of assets is trying to decide who gets the benefits,

4

this beneficiary or this beneficiary, that is not a trust

5

expense, that's an expense that relates solely to the benefits

6 ' of that beneficiary.
7

Let me address the comment that Marsha Snow was

8

talking to the decedent and related in her deposition he said I

9

could move the mobile home.

Your Honor, the only reason that

10

that is, is that Marsha Snow would have been the ultimate

11

residuary beneficiary.

12

could have done anything.

13

plenty of money, you can move it, you can do whatever you want

14

to, or you can leave it here and pay rent here, whatever you

15

choose to do, that has nothing to do with a life estate given

16

to Mrs. Womack, she's the ultimate residuary beneficiary.

17

She would have owned everything.

She

Her Dad is telling her there's

Now, with respect to our original petition, Your

18

Honor, it was originally brought for the very reason that I've

19

shown this Court, the non-exoneration problem.

20

originally paid off that debt which she shouldn't have.

21

we advised counsel of that, they said no, we disagree with you,

22

we're going to let her do it.

23

discovery, she's taken principle from the Trust, $17,000, then

24

we find out through discovery she's got over $10,000 in

25

attorney's fees, fighting about what?

Mrs. Womack
When

And then we find out through

Not whether the Trust is
29

1

being properly administered but whether or not she gets this or

2

she gets that and who gets what.

3

misusing the Trust funds for her to be able to take and keep

4

those attorney's fees in that instance is just inappropriate.

5

Your Honor, there is no dispute of fact relating to

6

the construction of this document or the issues we've brought

7

before the Court today.

And the whole thing is, she's

Thank you.

8

THE COURT:

Mr. Astill, thank you.

9

I've had opportunity to review the pleadings and I

10

appreciate the good briefing on and I think that this deals

11

with matters of law and not fact disputes.

12

the original Trust said, regardless of whether or not there are

13

some questions as to what the original Trust said, there is no

14

disagreement as to what the amendment says.

15

indicates that Ruby Womack may live in the mobile home,

16

Guerdon, as long as she desires, until she marries or dies.

17

she can say there as long as she lives at the outside.

18

re-marries, she will no longer have that and if she doesn't

19

want to live there, she doesn't have that.

20

clear to me that the very best she gets a life estate with

21

certain provisions that would cut it down: number one, her lack

22

of intent; number two, until she remarries.

23

inconsistency even if I look at the original Trust paragraph,

24

although the original Trust paragraph said more, there is no

25

inconsistency with what the amendment, in my mind says, H S to

When I review what

The amendment

So

If she

So that's pretty

I don't see any
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what the original Trust said.
There is no issue of material fact and I do not
accept the position claimed by Womack that she is entitled to a
revisionary interest, that is not supported by the language.
Going to the Special Provisions, she is to, Marsha excuse me - the remainder shall be divided among the decedent's
surviving children after everything is said and done with Ruby
Womack.

The remainder provides that the remainder of the Trust

Estate shall be held in Trust to provide Ruby Womack with
income.

The amendment specifically provides that the assets

were to be held in Trust and not given outright to Womack.
revision will go to the surviving children.
it, Ms. Snow is the only surviving child.

The

As I understand
The other sister has

died, so that's the only surviving heir and so she would be
entitled to the revisionary aspect of it; however Ruby Womack
will be allowed to have the income form the Trust.
Now, in my mind, income is income and while I
understand the position taken by Ms. Walton that I do not need
to look at statutory or constructive rules, that's exactly what
I would have to do in order to aid me in the construction of
these legal terms.

In doing that, the Court finds that income

is defined as the return in money or property derived from the
use of principle as stated in Utah Code 223-4 Sub 1, that
merely says that she's entitled to the income.
In sum, my analysis would conclude that when the
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Trust and the amendment are read in conjunction with the
definition of income, it is clear that Womack is entitled only
to the income generated from the principle of the Trust, not
the principle and no revisionary claim as to anything remaining
in the Trust related to the income and with that, while I at
first blush, Ms. Walton's argument seems to be reasonable as to
the debts of the van, specifically, I have to read that in
conjunction to the non-exoneration of provision as well as the
code section cited to me by Mr. Astill.

In that way the Court

finds most importantly what was not said, and it was not said
that the van would be subject, would be given to her free and
clear with all expenses to be paid by the estate.

It didn't

say that and when it didn't say that then I just have to look
at what the application of what wasn't said, and referring to
the code section, the Court is convinced that the debt against
the Trust, while Womack's claim that the debt both for the
$17,000 or so1 moving of the mobile home and the decedent's van
was against the Trust, is without merit in light of the
analysis that I've just explained.
Now, as to the attorney's fees I fall squarely in
line with the interpretation of Ashton v. Ashton.

The Court

did have opportunity to review that case and finds that
pursuant to the Court in Ashton indicating that the expenses
were incurred and her attorney's fees in her role as a claimanl
with interest that conflicts with other heirs to the estate no1

3;

as a personal representative of the estate. And in this case,
Womack incurred attorney's fees and other expenses in her role
as a beneficiary and cannot not assert these as expenses of the
Trust.

So for those reasons and I think I've come down almost

on fours, if not on all fours, with Mr. Astill's decision, the
motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted.
Mr. Astill, please be so kind as to draft up the
appropriate documents in this matter.
With that ruling, does that leave us with anything
for the hearing that is scheduled for the 8th of August?
MR. ASTILL:

Your Honor, if I - with that ruling, I

believe what it would leave is for Mrs. Womack to provide us
with an exact accounting for money she has spent from the Trust
which she has still not provided to us.
THE COURT: And with this ruling, the Trust is
entitled to have that.
MR. ASTILL:

So I guess the hearing in that date

would just be about how much she has spent and than a judgment
could be rendered on the exact amount of the figures.
THE COURT:

Well, and you all talk to see if that

hearing is even necessary.

I will keep it on the calendar

subject to you all calling my clerk and telling her it's not
needed. Thank you very much.

The court's in recess.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
RICHARD D. SNOW, DECEASED, AND
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY
TRUST,

)
;)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

;
)
)

Probate No. 993900093 EF
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

This matter having come before the Court pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment
filed by Marcia L. Snow, the sole surviving child of the decedent, and Ruby Womack, the personal
representative of the decedent's estate. After receiving cross-motions for summary judgment and
memoranda in support thereof, a hearing was held on this matter on February 14, 2000. Marcia L.
Snow was represented by Dennis M. Astill and Ruby Womack was represented by Robyn RoweWalton. The Court, having reviewed the record on file, received evidence and argument from the
parties, and being fully advised, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The signed and notarized Inventory filed by Ruby Womack unequivocally states that

the Estate of Richard D. Snow is comprised of assets valued in at least the amount of $44,000,
comprised of a Guredon mobile home (valued at $35,000) and a van (valued at $9,000).
2.

On July 14,1999, Ms. Snow made a claim of exempt property under Utah Code Ann.

§75-2-403.
3.

There is no surviving spouse of the Richard D. Snow Estate.

4.

On July 30, 1999, Ms. Womack denied Ms. Snow's Petition for Exempt Property.

5.

Elased upon the Inventory of Ms. Womack, the property received by Ms. Snow did

not have a value of$5,000, the Inventory specifying that the property had little or no value.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Ann. §75-3-803 is not applicable because a claim for an exempt property

allowance is an entitlement.
2.

As there is no surviving spouse of the Richard D. Snow Estate, the children of the

decedent are entitled to an exempt property allowance.
3.

The exempt property allowance applicable to the decedent's estate is $5,000.

2

4.

The Richard D. Snow Estate has sufficient assets to pay the $5,000 exempt property

allowance.
5.

Based upon the Petition of Marcia L. Snow, she is entitled to the full amount of the

exempt property allowance, i.e. the sum of $5,000.
DATED this/ /day ofSSIsh, 2000.
BY THE COURT

District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

Robyn Rowe-Walton
Attorneys for Ruby Womack
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ORDER
1.

Marcia L. Snow's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

2.

Ruby Womack, as personal representative of the decedent's estate, is ordered to pay

to Marcia L. Snow the amount of $5,000, as the exempt property allowance for the decedent's estate.

DATED thii
lis / dday. of

4_
72000.

BY THE

District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Robyn Rowe-Walton
Attorneys for Ms. Ruby Womack
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